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"WE'RE MAD AS HELL AND WE AREN'T GOING TO
TAKE IT ANYMORE": 1 THE PRESS RESPONDS
TO MERITLESS LIBEL SUITS
While recognizing the power of the media to destroy a reputation
in an instant of television coverage or with a banner headline, we
must also recognize the power of libel actions, even their mere
threat or pendency, to destroy the press itself and with it the very
foundation of our democracy.2
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing problem enveloping libel litigation-one which
threatens the constitutional protections secured for the press3 by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan4 and its progeny. This problem manifests
itself in the form of lawsuits designed to stifle press defendants' publica-
tions by coercion or to punish them for stories previously published.
Such lawsuits cause the press great expense,5 jeopardize its libel defense
insurance coverage6 and force it to spend countless hours in court.7
1. Although this phrase has enjoyed popular usage for some time, it is probably most
closely associated with the motion picture Network (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976).
2. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684, 686 (D.N.J. 1985).
3. The term "press" will be used throughout this Comment to refer to members of the
journalism profession, regardless of the medium through which they practice their craft.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
5. Libel defense costs are generally paid by insurance carriers. Rapidly increasing insur-
ance costs, however, are changing the nature of this once-satisfactory arrangement. Baer, In-
surers to Libel Defense Counsel: "The Party's Over," AM. LAW., Nov. 1985, at 69.
According to James Goodale of Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, a typical libel case
cost approximately $20,000 to defend in the 1970's. At a libel insurance conference in June
1985, Goodale reported that, as of that date, bills for $200,000 to $300,000 were not uncom-
mon. Congressman Charles Shumer of New York placed the amount at closer to $150,000.
Id. at 69-70.
CNA Insurance Companies, a major libel insurance carrier, paid a portion of the bills for
the Sharon (Sharon v. Time, Inc., No. 85-7029 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Courts file)) and Westmoreland (Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., No. 82
Civ. 7913 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 30, 1982) (dismissed at plaintiff's request)) cases before decid-
ing not to write any new libel policies after December 31, 1985. Those partial bills reportedly
totaled $15 million. Insurers have recently implemented cost cutting measures; in the last six
months of 1985, many policy premiums and deductibles doubled. Id. at 69.
6. Although some believe that media lawyers are responsible for existing first amendment
law, insurance companies presented with the bills incurred in establishing that law may soon
decline to participate. Media/Professional Insurance, Inc., the largest libel claims manage-
ment company in the country, has decided not to cover all or even part of the defense costs for
the largest media organizations, particularly television networks. Media/Professional's assis-
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While no one disputes a public figure's right to defend his or her reputa-
tion,8 meritless libel suits9 have so ignited the press as to give rise to a
new phenomenon: the press defendant's countersuit. 10 This Comment
tant general counsel, Chad Milton, predicts that high-risk companies will become self-insuring
due to an inability to find satisfactory coverage. Jeffrey Vosburgh, Assistant Vice-President of
Safeco-Media/Professional's principal carrier-agrees. Id. at 70.
Bermuda Mutual Insurance Company, Ltd. holds its insured companies responsible for
20% of the legal fees that exceed their deductibles. Lloyds of London has ceased writing new
libel defense policies and provides only limited coverage for its current clients. Media/Profes-
sional's president and general counsel, Lawrence Worrall, notes: "Small publishers who are
doing investigative reporting, who don't have the assets to pay large premiums and sustain
large deductibles, are having difficulty finding a carrier." Id.
All of this suggests that self-insurance may be the only option for some press organiza-
tions. But even more alarming is the possibility that self-insurance may result in self-censor-
ship. Former New York Times counsel James Goodale foresees pressure from press ownership
to curtail aggressive reporting in order to avoid expensive litigation. Floyd Abrams, current
counsel for the New York Times and NBC, among others, also predicts that risky, investigative
journalism will fall prey to economic demands. Id. at 72. This effect is doubly distressing
since it is precisely this sort of journalism upon which democracy depends. See infra text
accompanying notes 15 & 20.
CBS, due to an unusually large deductible, is nearly self-insured since an average year will
not require expenditures which substantially exceed its deductible. Baer, supra note 5, at 70.
According to CBS general counsel George Vradenburg III, the insurance situation has not
affected editorial policy. Still, he notes that costs to the press itself may result in "concern"
over stories broadcast. Id. at 69, 72. Floyd Abrams best summarized the potential chill: "The
ultimate way to avoid the risk is not to write the story." Id. at 72.
7. For example, Anthony Herbert filed suit against Barry Lando, Mike Wallace and At-
lantic Monthly on January 25, 1974. The action was finally dismissed on Lando's motion for
summary judgment on January 15, 1986. Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2916 (1986). Although this case was unusual in that the discovery process
was the subject of extended litigation and thus the case was delayed, it suggests that even
summary judgment is not always a satisfactory alternative for a press defendant anxious to get
out of the courtroom and back to the newsroom.
For a more complete discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling concerning discovery in
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of summary judgment, see infra note 60.
8. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 262-63 (1974)
(White, J., concurring). Justice White, critical of the expansion of the public figure doctrine
and its effect on the "average citizen's" ability to meet the burden of proof in a libel action,
noted the Court's traditional respect for an individual's reputation interest. Id. See also infra
note 19.
9. The meritless libel suit is not an everyday occurrence. Genovese, Unmerited Libel
Cases Trigger Countersuits, PRESSTIME, May 1985, at 6. Two commentators suggest that such
cases are those in which the plaintiff has exhibited bad faith, by suing either to stifle future
publication or to punish the press for previous stories. Cutting & Levine, Fighting Back-
Media Lawyers are Developing New Tactics to Discourage Libel Suits, COMM. LAW., Fall 1985,
at 16. Gary B. Pruitt, counsel for McClatchy Newspapers, cautions that "filing a counterclaim
should not become a knee-jerk reaction to every libel suit." Genovese, supra, at 7. Pruitt
suggests that publishers carefully examine the circumstances of a libel suit before taking ac-
tion. Id. See also infra text accompanying note 48.
10. "Countersuit" is actually somewhat of a misnomer, since there are at least three proce-
dural approaches available depending on the cause of action. Actions for infringment of first
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will discuss the feasibility of such an action and various theories by
which it can be supported: first amendment infringement,11 abuse of pro-
cess, 12 malicious prosecution 3 and actions for attorney's fees.
14
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
"[W]e consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."' 5
With those words, the United States Supreme Court rendered its
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'6 thus changing the face of
both libel and constitutional law. This is not to suggest, however, that
either discipline had remained stagnant prior to the Court's decision. Li-
bel law has been fraught with tension since the invention of the printing
press, and has continued to evolve ever since.17 English common law
only examined whether a statement was defamatory; American common
law sought to improve upon this formula by injecting into the contro-
versy the question of the statement's truth or falsity.
18
amendment rights or abuse of process can be filed either as counterclaims within the libel
action (see, e.g., Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985), discussed infra at
notes 92-156 & 280-85) or as countersuits concurrent with the libel action (see, e.g., E.W.
Scripps v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984), discussed infra at notes
196-221 & 258-63).
A more traditional approach requires waiting until the libel action is resolved. If the press
defendant prevails, he may initiate actions for malicious prosecution or attorney's fees.
Countersuits have been advocated not only by the press but by its insurers. Chad Milton,
assistant general counsel for Media/Professional Insurance, Inc., advocates the use of counter-
suits, particularly when a libel plaintiff has sued for publicity purposes as much as for redress
of a grievance. Milton suggests that countersuits will effectively discourage frivolous suits,
encourage plaintiff's attorneys to think carefully before initiating a libel suit and help the
press-and presumably, its insurers-recover defense costs. Baer, supra note 5, at 71.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 72-224.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 225-85.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 286-314.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 315-403.
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. Kaufman, Press Privacy and Malice: Reflections on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 5
CARDOZO L. REV. 867, 869 (1984).
18. Id. A defamatory statement is one which "tends so to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). In general, liability
for defamation requires the following elements: "(a) a false and defamatory statement con-
cerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to
negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespec-
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Despite the American alteration, a dilemma persisted. That di-
lemma resulted from a desire to reconcile two competing values: the
rights to free speech and a free press and the right to reputation. 19 De-
mocracy depends on informed voters making informed choices; informed
choices can only result from the dissemination of news unfettered by gov-
ernment or majority control.20 Yet, simultaneously there was concern
that the press should not excessively intrude upon the privacy of others.2
Two nineteenth century commentators observed:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds
of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of
the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is
pursued with industry as well as effrontery .... [C]olumn upon
tive of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." Id. at § 558
(1977).
19. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 262-63 (1974)
(White, J., concurring); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-34 (1979) and cases cited
therein.
20. See supra text accompanying note 15. In a letter to Colonel Edward Carrington,
Thomas Jefferson wrote: "[T]he basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the
very first object should be to keep that right.. . ." J. BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 388
(15th ed. 1980). Two centuries later, Judge Learned Hand observed that the first amendment
"presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and will always be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. I (1945). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-
75 (1964) ("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of
self-government."); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (The first
"[a]mendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, [and] that a free
press is a condition of a free society.").
21. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published an article reviewing various cases
which, although not expressly recognizing a right of privacy, protected that right in some
form. The authors concluded that privacy was entitled to recognition as a separate right.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
The right of privacy, defined in the comment to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A as
"the right to be let alone," was recognized early in this century in Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). The court held that the publication of a person's
picture, without his consent, to advertise the publisher's business violated that person's privacy
for which he could recover damages. Id. at 216, 50 S.E. at 79.
Four forms of invasion are cited by the Restatement: "[U]nreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another,.., appropriation of another's name or likeness.... unreasonable public-
ity given to the other's private life .... [or] publicity that unreasonably places the other in a
false light before the public .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A.
The Supreme Court has held that a person's constitutional right to privacy entitles him to
freedom from "unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials." Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 661 (1979). However, the Court has also held that the right of privacy does not
prevent the publication of information already in the public record. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975).
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column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by
intrusion upon the domestic circle.2"
Thus, while legal minds studied the questions of falsity, common
law malice and defendants' good faith, the controversy over free press
versus reputation persisted. The United States Supreme Court examined
these very issues in Sullivan. The case arose as the result of an advertise-
ment which appeared in the New York Times and was signed by the
"Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Free-
dom in the South."23 The advertisement included statements concerning
police action directed against students participating in a civil rights dem-
onstration on the steps of the state capitol building in Montgomery, Ala-
bama.24 The plaintiff, Sullivan, was the Commissioner of Public Affairs
whose duties included supervision of the Montgomery police depart-
ment.25 Sullivan claimed that the advertisement's implied criticism of
the police department would be imputed to him and that he had there-
fore been libeled.26 The trial court held for the plaintiff and the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed.27
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the state
court's decision28 and, in so doing, set new boundaries for discussion of
public issues. The Court established a standard which must be met
before a public official can recover damages for a defamatory falsehood-
that of "actual malice."29 Actual malice "prohibits a public official from
22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 196. Although this criticism was published
nearly one hundred years ago, it is no doubt a complaint embraced by many contemporary
critics of the press. Kaufman, supra note 17, at 868.
It is no secret that the press has recently engendered stringent reprobation. Viewed by
some as aloof and arrogant, concerned only with sales or ratings, its members are continually
condemned. Unquestionably, when viewers are repeatedly subjected to footage of an astro-
naut's parents watching the exploding space shuttle which carried their daughter, the press'
reputation for insensitivity is buttressed. "The people's right to know is not a synonym for the
media's right to bully." Rosenberg, The Best and Worst of Shuttle Coverage, L.A. Times, Feb.
3, 1986, pt. VI, at 7, col. 2. Similarly, the press' truthfulness is subject to careful scrutiny when
major newspapers admit that an award winning article was purely fiction. Kaufman, supra
note 17, at 868.
Still, the press serves a crucial function. See supra note 20. During the space shuttle
tragedy, the television press in particular provided the catharsis necessary to assuage a grieving
nation. Rosenberg, supra at 1, col. 6. As for truthfulness, Justice Powell explained: "The
First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
23. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-57.
24. Id. at 257.
25. Id. at 256.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 262-63.
28. Id. at 292.
29. Id. at 279-80. Judge Kaufman theorized that the Court's decision to use the term
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recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ... knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."
30
Sullivan set the wheels of change in motion. In Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts31 and its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker,32 the
Supreme Court held that a "public figure," having attained that status by
position alone or by having thrust himself into the "vortex" of a public
controversy, was entitled to less protection than that provided under an
ordinary negligence standard, but more than that provided by the actual
malice standard.33 The Court explained this new standard, stating that a
public figure may recover damages if the defamatory falsehood would
result in substantial damage to reputation "on a showing of highly unrea-
sonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers."34
Chief Justice Warren, concurring in the result, noted that the pro-
posed standard was of an "unusual and uncertain formulation"3 " and
would be useless to "guide a jury of laymen or afford the protection for
speech and debate that is fundamental to our society and guaranteed by
the First Amendment.' ' 36 The Chief Justice instead proposed that the
actual malice standard of Sullivan be extended to all public figures.
3 7
In 1974, the Supreme Court again spoke on the issue of libel and
public figures. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,38 the Court held that the
"actual malice" was an attempt to remain faithful to our common law heritage. Yet, he noted,
"[b]y choosing a term that was intended to signify something other than its common sense and
common law definition, the Supreme Court inadvertently created semantic chaos." Kaufman,
supra note 17, at 873 (emphasis added). Judge Kaufman further posited that the confusion
over actual malice and common law or "ill-will" malice subsequently resulted in the Court's
decision to allow discovery into the press defendant's state of mind during preparation of the
statements at issue. Id. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 44-46.
30. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
31. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 155.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
36. Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
38. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). A Chicago policeman shot and killed a youth whose family later
hired attorney Elmer Gertz to represent them in civil litigation against the officer. Id. at 325.
Robert Welch, Inc., published a magazine espousing the views of the John Birch Society. The
magazine printed an article suggesting that the testimony against the officer at his criminal
trial was false and that the trial was part of a nation-wide Communist campaign to discredit
[Vol. 20.:45
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actual malice standard does not protect publishers of defamatory state-
ments concerning a person who is neither a public figure nor a public
official.3 9 The Court reasoned that private figures have little or no oppor-
tunity to gain access to public forums and have not voluntarily exposed
themselves to the risk of press scrutiny as have public figures. Therefore,
the state interest in protecting the private figure's right to reputation
takes precedence over a publisher's right to disseminate information.4
The Court left to the states the task of defining the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual.4" In defining a public figure, the Gertz Court stated:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some oc-
cupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly,
those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite
attention and comment.42
In summation, the Court stated that when there is no clear evidence of
general fame or notoriety within the community, or of pervasive involve-
ment in the affairs of society, a person is not a public figure "for all as-
pects of his life."43
In Herbert v. Lando,' the Supreme Court held that there was no
local law enforcement agencies. Id. at 325-26. The article indicated that Gertz was responsi-
ble for the plot against the officer, and stated that Gertz had been an official of the Marxist
League for Industrial Democracy. It also reported that Gertz had been an officer in the Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, to which the article assigned responsibility for " 'the Communist attack
on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention.'" Id. at 326. The article also
labeled Gertz a "'Leninist,'" id., a "'Communist-fronter,'" id., and indicated that Gertz
possessed a criminal record. A photo accompanied the article and was captioned, "'Elmer
Gertz of Red Guild harasses Nuccio [the officer].'" Id. at 327.
The statements were substantially incorrect. While Gertz had belonged to the National
Lawyers Guild 15 years earlier, there was no indication that he or the Guild had participated
in the 1968 Chicago demonstrations. Id. at 326. Moreover, Gertz had never been a member of
the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy and there was no evidence that he was a "Lenin-
ist" or a "Communist-fronter." Id.
39. Id. at 343.
40. Id. at 343-48.
41. Id. at 347.
42. Id. at 345.
43. Id. at 352.
44. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Anthony Herbert is a retired Army officer who served in Viet
Nam. In 1969-70, he received considerable attention from the press after accusing his superior
officers of covering up reports of war crimes. On February 4, 1973, Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) broadcast a program about Herbert and his accusations. The program was
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first amendment privilege barring a plaintiff from conducting discovery
as to the press defendant's state of mind within the editorial process. 45
The Court reasoned that this inquiry, although intrusive, was necessary
to determine whether the defendant knew of possible falsity or acted with
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the matter reported.46
Thus, the law concerning libel of public figures and first amendment
protections of the press has undergone a spectacular metamorphosis
since 1964 and remains unsettled still. It is against this backdrop that
the options available to a press inundated by libel suits are examined.
III. THE PROBLEM
Meritless libel suits, though not unheard of, are still comparatively
rare.47 Consequently, it may be difficult to know when such a suit has
been filed. Attorney Robert D. Sack suggests that the following situa-
tions might provide grounds for a countersuit or subsequent action by a
press defendant:
1. Proof that suit was brought for reasons of harassment,
particularly if the plaintiff has been involved in a pattern of
similar litigation.
2. A case that seems frivolous on its face, where what
was published is obviously and clearly true or privileged ....
3. A situation where the case is not about the particular
plaintiff. For example, a journalist suing for libel on the basis
of the statement, "all journalists take bribes."
4. Something that is plainly a statement of opinion ....
5. A statement that is clearly not defamatory.
6. A plaintiff who refuses to discontinue the suit even
when, during the course of litigation, it becomes certain there is
not sufficient fault on which a verdict can rest.48
Lurking beneath the expense and time consumption inherent in de-
fending meritless libel suits is a more costly and insidious threat: self-
censorship. With the increasing costs of libel litigation49 and the willing-
produced by Barry Lando and narrated by Mike Wallace. Lando subsequently published an
article about Herbert in Atlantic Monthly. Herbert then sued Lando, Wallace, CBS and At-
lantic Monthly for libel. Id. at 155-56.
45. Id. at 175.
46. Id. at 170-71.
47. See supra note 9.
48. Weber, Countersuing, ASNE BULL., Sept. 1985, at 16.
49. See supra note 5.
[Vol. 20:45
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ness of wealthy or corporate-subsidized plaintiffs"0 to engage in lengthy
and expensive proceedings,"1 the self-censorship warned of in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan52 may have already begun. For example,
McClatchy Newspapers 3 recently published a story linking Senator
Paul Laxalt54 to organized crime and discussing skimming activities
which allegedly took place in a Nevada casino while the casino was par-
tially owned by Laxalt.55 After Senator Laxalt sued McClatchy for libel,
50. Floyd Abrams cited "[tihe participation by large corporations, on behalf of their exec-
utives" as a threat to the press' "ability.. .to write vigorously about the very people who
should be scrutinized most carefully: those in power." Abrams, It's a landmark to freedom of
expression, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 38, 40-41. Abrams noted that Mobil Oil directly paid the
costs of its president's suit against the Washington Post (Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90
(D.C. Cir.), vacated in part, reh'g granted (en banc), 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Id.
Martin Garbus noted that Mobil subsequently began carrying insurance providing funds for
executives who decide to sue for defamation. Garbus, New Challenge To Press Freedom, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 33, 49.
In addition, groups such as the Capitol Legal Foundation, which participated in West-
moreland v. CBS, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 7913 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 30, 1982) (dismissed at plain-
tiff's request), have recently emerged to support or actually prosecute libel claims. Organized
fundraising has aided the prosecution of other cases such as Sharon v. Time, Inc., No. 85-7029
(2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) and Laxalt v. McClatchy, No.
CV-R-84-407-ECR (D. Nev. filed Sept. 21, 1984). Kaufman, Libel 1980-85: Promises and
Realities, COMM. LAW., Fall 1985, at 1, 20.
51. Why are people willing to engage in lengthy and expensive libel actions? Surveying
approximately 800 libel cases, the Iowa Libel Research Project found that "most libel plaintiffs
do not sue to win, but feel they win by suing." Randolph, The Latest Brand of Libel Suit is
Won or Lost on the Courthouse Steps, COMM. LAW., Fall 1985, at 7, 8. The study further
indicated that although plaintiffs' attorneys often request large damage awards, most plaintiffs
are primarily interested in "correct[ing] the record and ... get[ting] even." Griffith, Getting
Even Without Winning, TIME, Aug. 19, 1985, at 55.
Attorney Gerry Spence, who successfully represented the former Miss Wyoming in a libel
suit against Penthouse, stated that the public "'fear[s] the power of the press.'" Randolph,
supra, at 9. Spence queried: "'What do we do with things we are afraid of? What do you do
with a snake? You step on its head."' Id.
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In its discussion of truth as an absolute defense to a claim of
libel, the Sullivan Court stated:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-
leads to a comparable "self-censorship.". . . Under such a rule, would-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is be-
lieved to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only
statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." The rule thus dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
53. McClatchy Newspapers owns The Sacramento Bee, The Fresno Bee and The Modesto
Bee as well as other media entities. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 739 (D. Nev.
1985).
54. Paul Laxalt is a United States Senator from Nevada. Id. at 737.
55. Id. at 739. The articles at issue included a series entitled "Agents Say Casino
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McClatchy counterclaimed for infringement of first amendment rights
and abuse of process. 6 Discussing the effect of Senator Laxalt's lawsuit
and his actions prior to filing, 7 McClatchy Newspapers alleged that the
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) were influenced to discontinue work on their stories
concerning Senator Laxalt's casino activities."
The problem, then, is this: while the actual malice standard is ar-
guably sufficient to protect the press when there is a genuine question as
to the libelous nature of specific statements, the process of litigation must
be completed before a result can be determined. When the libel plaintiff
does not have a valid claim, litigation must still be completed, forcing the
press defendant to expend time and money and endure an extremely in-
trusive discovery process.5 9 Thus, as the case law currently stands, press
defendants have little protection against the meritless libel suit."°
'Skimmed' During Senator Laxalt's Ownership," written by staff reporter Denny Walsh and
published in all three newspapers on November 1, 1983. Art Nauman, ombudsman of The
Sacramento Bee, wrote an article published on the same day in all three papers entitled "Laxalt
Donors Included Gaming Figures With Mob Ties." Nauman also wrote an additional article
entitled "Laxalt Buried" which appeared only in The Sacramento Bee on November 6, 1983.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Senator Laxalt made written and personal demands for a retraction and disclosure of
confidential sources. In addition, he instigated a state investigation into the statements con-
tained in the article, urging state officials to compel disclosure of the documentation and
sources supporting those statements. Memorandum in Opposition to Senator Laxalt's Motion
to Dismiss Counterclaims at 2-5, Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985) [here-
inafter McClatchy Memorandum].
The district court discounted the chilling effect of Laxalt's actions, noting that Nevada
law requires the libel plaintiff to first write a letter demanding retraction before filing suit.
Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 747. The court further stated that "[a]ny individual can demand that
information in the possession of a newspaper be turned over to the police for further investiga-
tion," similarly discounting the effect of Senator Laxalt's status as a United States Senator. Id.
at 748.
58. McClatchy Memorandum, supra note 57, at 4-5. This allegation was not addressed by
the court. For a more complete discussion of Laxalt, see infra text accompanying notes 92-
156 & 279-84.
59. The United States Supreme Court has held that when a journalist is sued for libel,
there is no first amendment privilege barring the plaintiff from conducting discovery delving
into the editorial process and the state of mind of those responsible for publishing the allegedly
defamatory statement. Such discovery, however, must produce evidence necessary to prove a
critical element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170-75
(1979). This ruling approved previously forbidden intrusion into the editorial process. Assum-
ing that such intrusion is necessary to determine whether actual malice exists-the crucial part
of the plaintiff's case-it is clearly unwarranted when the plaintiff's claims are without merit.
60. What little protection does exist takes the form of a motion for summary judgment,
which has been labeled "the focal point of most libel litigation." Kovner, Motion for Summary
Judgment, PRACISING LAW INSTITUTE, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN-THE NExT
TWENTY YEARS 303, 305 (1984). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides as follows:
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IV. THE SOLUTION
The press defendant faced with a meritless libel suit has several
"A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
Subsection (c) provides that a favorable judgment shall be rendered if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Id. However, the court is bound to examine the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," id., to determine its verdict.
This suggests that a substantial portion of discovery must be completed in order to support a
motion for summary judgment. The Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC) recently pub-
lished a report in which it discussed motions for summary judgment in the fifty states. High
Success Rate Shown on Summary Judgment Motions, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) Feb. 19, 1985
[hereinafter High Success Rate]. LDRC warned that more discovery is currently being re-
quired since the Supreme Court's decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (see
infra this note), thus resulting in greater expenditure of time and money before courts will
consider summary judgment motions. High Success Rate, supra.
Most state provisions for summary judgment are remarkably similar and therefore present
similar problems. Kovner, supra, at 308. Kovner suggested New York's rule as a representa-
tive example: "The motion shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the
cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of
law in directing judgment in favor of any party." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3212(b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1986).
In another report prepared for the Practising Law Institute, Floyd Abrams discussed the
application of summary judgment in libel actions. Abrams, Summary Judgment in Libel Ac-
tions, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS 373 (1984). Abrams noted that summary judgment was frequently granted in libel
cases, especially those involving public figure plaintiffs, citing Washington Post Co. v. Keogh,
365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1011 (1967), as a typical example of such
cases. In Keogh, the court noted the possibility that a plaintiff might be motivated by a desire
to harass the press, and that one purpose behind the standard imposed in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan was
to prevent persons from being discouraged in the full and free exercise of their First
Amendment rights with respect to the conduct of their government .... Unless
persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their First Amendment rights are
assured freedom from the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend to become self-
censors.
Id. at 968.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), however,
cast a shadow on the appropriateness of summary judgment motions. In Hutchinson, Senator
William Proxmire awarded his "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" to Ronald Hutchinson,
a behavioral scientist studying methods of measuring agression. Id. at 114-15. Senator
Proxmire's awards were given out to publicize what the Senator felt were "the most egregious
examples of wasteful governmental spending." Id. at 114.
Hutchinson sued Senator Proxmire for libel, alleging that the award and the surrounding
publicity had damaged his professional and academic reputation. Id. The district court
granted summary judgment for Senator Proxmire and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at
118, 120-21. Reversing the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court held that Hutchinson
was not a public figure. More importantly for this discussion, however, the Court discussed
the district court's statement that "in determining whether a plaintiff had made an adequate
showing of 'actual malice,' summary judgment might well be the rule." Id. at 120. In the now
famous footnote 9, the Court stated: "[We] are constrained to express some doubt about the
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available alternatives. One solution is to file an action for infringement of
so-called 'rule.' The proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question,
and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition." Id. at 120 n.9 (citations omitted).
The court declined to deal further with the propriety of utilizing summary judgment when
complex issues such as actual malice are involved, reasoning that the question was not before
the Court. Id.
Abrams is quick to point out that the issue was left open "for future resolution." Abrams,
supra at 375. In addition, Abrams noted that the Court was entirely silent about the appropri-
ateness of summary judgment when another element of libel (e.g., the existence of a false and
defamatory statement) is at issue. Id. at 375-76.
The United States Supreme Court recently spoke again on the issue of summary judgment
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), holding that "the determination of
whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive
evidentiary standards that apply to the case." Id. at 2514. Thus, in a libel action in which the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies, that same standard must be met to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Id. In a footnote, the Court somewhat clarified the Hutchin-
son footnote, stating that it "was simply an acknowledgement of our general reluctance 'to
grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition
to the protections embodied in the substantive laws.'" Id. at 2514 n.7 (quoting Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)). While this statement appears encouraging at first blush,
whether summary judgment is appropriate in libel actions remains an unanswered question,
LDRC reported that 75% of libel defendants were successful on summary judgment mo-
tions in 1980-82, the period immediately following the Hutchinson decision. High Success
Rate, supra. During the four years prior to Hutchinson, libel defendants had prevailed on 78-
80% of summary judgment motions. Id. Thus, as Abrams pointed out, the expected fall-out
from the Hutchinson decision was less severe than anticipated, although the most recent
LDRC study concluded that summary judgment motions during 1982-84 were successful 74%
of the time. Id.
LDRC warned, however, that "'in far too many cases summary judgment is still not
granted.'" Id. Further, LDRC noted the possibility that such motions are being attempted
less frequently, resulting in an increased number of libel trials. Id.
Abrams cited two approaches to summary judgment motions since the Hutchinson deci-
sion. In Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980), cited by Abrams as the "most influential post-Hutchinson
case," Abrams, supra, at 377, the court specified the neutral approach to summary judgment
motions. The court interpreted footnote 9 as requiring that "neither grant nor denial of a
motion for summary judgment is to be preferred," Yiamouyiannis, 619 F.2d at 940, stating
that any chilling effect resulting from the lawsuit was to have no bearing on the court's deci-
sion. For cases adhering to the neutral approach, see, e.g., Clark v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983); Schultz v. Newsweek,
668 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1982); Guccione v. Flynt, 618 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Bryant v.
Associated Press, 595 F. Supp. 814 (D.V.I. 1984); Foodscience Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
592 F. Supp. 362 (D. Vt. 1984); Pep v. Newsweek, 553 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The second approach is one preferring summary judgment. Cases following this approach
indicate that concern over the chilling effect on the press of defending lawsuits is paramount.
See, e.g., Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
907 (1982); Kotlinkoff v. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982); see also
Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1985). Although the Schiavone
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, it expressed concern over the
effect of ongoing litigation, stating:
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its first amendment rights.61 Although such an action has survived a
motion to dismiss in a California state court,62 similar claims were dis-
missed in three federal court actions. 63 A second solution is an action for
abuse of process,64 filed either as a counterclaim or a countersuit. Abuse
of process actions have survived motions to dismiss in two federal juris-
dictions65 and in a California state court;66 a fourth action67 was recently
dismissed in federal court. A third alternative is an action for malicious
prosecution.68 Although employed sparingly, a malicious prosecution
action proved a successful alternative for a Kentucky newspaper.69 Per-
haps the most traditional and successful solution has been an action for
attorney's fees,7° filed either against the libel plaintiff, his attorney, or
both. Fees have been awarded to press defendants in at least three such
cases.
7 1
A. Infringement of First Amendment Rights
A claim based on the first amendment is perhaps the most specula-
[Tjhe mere pendency and continuation of such actions must of necessity have a chill-
ing effect upon the freedom of the press. If the threat of a libel action is causing any
segment of the media to hesitate to publish knowingly false or misleading informa-
tion about persons or companies, then it is serving a worthwhile function. But if it is
causing hesitation by the media in those borderline situations in which the public has
a right to know, then one of our most important liberties is in peril....
Therefore, probably more than any other type of case, summary judgments in
libel actions should be readily available and granted where appropriate.
Id. at 686.
Thus, while statistics indicate that motions for summary judgment are still predominantly
successful, the potential chilling effect of a pending lawsuit remains-particularly in light of a
post-Hutchinson trend, bolstered by Anderson, toward neutral application of summary judg-
ment. In addition, the potential for harassment remains, especially in cases in which summary
judgment is precluded due to the existence of a material question of fact.
61. See infra notes 72-224 and accompanying text.
62. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984).
63. Feder v. Woodward, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Rewald v. West-
ern Sun, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2494 (D. Haw. 1985); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp.
737 (D. Nev. 1985).
64. See infra notes 224-85 and accompanying text.
65. Feder v. Woodward, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Rewald v. West-
ern Sun, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2494 (D. Haw. 1985).
66. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984).
67. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985).
68. See infra notes 286-314 and accompanying text.
69. Marcum v. Kirk, No. 82-CI-951 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 1985) aff'd, Kirk v. Marcum,
Nos. 85-CA-798-MR, 85-CA-951-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 1986).
70. See infra notes 315-404 and accompanying text.
71. Porter v. Qualls, No. 20935 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1984); Carr v. Times-Picayune
Publishing, 619 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. La. 1985); Daily Gazette v. Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262 (W. Va.
1985).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tive and yet the most philosophically satisfying of all the proposed solu-
tions.72 The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom ... of the press."73 This directive from the
Founding Fathers has been applied to the states via the fourteenth
amendment, thus prohibiting federal or state action abridging freedom of
the press.74
There are two sets of circumstances in which a defendant's first
amendment argument might apply. The first involves a lawsuit initiated
by a federal or state official which is designed to violate or effectively
results in a violation of the press defendant's responsibility and constitu-
tional right to disseminate newsworthy information. The second in-
volves a private individual's request for the court-an arm of the state-
to engage in a similar violation.
1. Infringement by a government official
It is well settled that a federal official may not infringe the constitu-
tional rights of an individual. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,75 federal agents first manacled the plaintiff
in his apartment in front of his wife and children before arresting him for
alleged narcotics violations.76 The Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment guarantees of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures had been denied the plaintiff by federal agents acting under color
of their authority. This denial gave rise to a cause of action for
damages.77
Justice Brennan, comparing the difference between actions of pri-
vate and government infringers, wrote: "[A]n agent acting-albeit un-
constitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater
capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority
72. First amendment law has been described by at least one author as "God's work."
Baer, supra note 5, at 69. Perhaps because it is based on the document fundamental to our
system of government-indeed, to our way of life-a first amendment argument is the most
philosophically satisfying of the solutions presented.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. The Supreme Court first recognized the incorporation of the first amendment in Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925):
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Con-
gress-are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
Id. at 666.
75. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).




other than his own."' 78 The Court noted that merely invoking federal
power is normally sufficient to weaken a citizen's resistance to an unlaw-
ful entry or arrest.79
In Davis v. Passman,8 ° the Court extended its holding in Bivens to
include causes of action arising under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.8 Plaintiff Shirley Davis had been hired by Congressman
Otto Passman as a deputy administrative assistant on February 1, 1974.82
Five months later, Passman terminated Davis' employment, stating that
although Davis was an able and energetic worker, it was essential that
the position be held by a man.83 Davis filed suit, alleging that Passman's
conduct discriminated against her on the basis of sex, thus violating her
fifth amendment right to due process.8 4 The Supreme Court, following
its reasoning in Bivens, held that a private cause of action does arise from
a violation of fifth amendment rights.
In 1976, a first amendment action joined the line of cases upholding
a cause of action for violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights. In
Elrod v. Burns,8 6 the plaintiffs were non-civil service employees of the
Cook County, Illinois Sheriff's Office.87 They alleged that they were
threatened with loss of employment, or in some instances actually dis-
charged, for failing to join the Democratic party. The dismissals were
allegedly ordered by the Sheriff.88 The plaintiffs contended that this ac-
tivity violated their first amendment freedoms of association and belief.89
The Supreme Court, observing that "[t]he loss of First Amendment free-
doms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irrep-
arable injury,"9 affirmed the appellate court decision granting injunctive
relief.9
Clearly, in light of these cases, a viable cause of action exists for
violation of first amendment rights by a government official. However, in
each of the above cases, the government official acted in an official capac-
78. Id. at 392.
79. Id. at 394.
80. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
81. Id. at 234.
82. Id. at 230.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 231.
85. Id. at 234.
86. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
87. Id. at 350.
88. Id. at 351.
89. Id. at 350.
90. Id. at 373.
91. Id.
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ity-either as a federal narcotics agent making an arrest, a congressman
choosing his official staff or a sheriff making a similar selection. This
factor is of vital importance to such causes of action. In fact, as illus-
trated in Laxalt v. McClatchy,9 2 it is critical to the survival of such a
claim.
Laxalt resulted from a series of articles published in The Sacra-
mento Bee, The Fresno Bee and The Modesto Bee on November 1 and 6,
1983. The articles linked Senator Paul Laxalt with organized crime.
Laxalt sued McClatchy Newspapers, owner of the three newspapers, for
libel and defamation.
93
McClatchy filed a counterclaim for violation of its first amendment
rights, alleging that Laxalt had "used his power and influence as an
United States Senator to punish [McClatchy] and to burden and chill the
exercise of [its] first amendment rights." 94 The district court granted
Laxalt's motion to dismiss the first amendment counterclaim, holding
that Laxalt did not act "under color of federal law."95 The court further
held that McClatchy was not deprived of a federal right.96
McClatchy argued that Laxalt acted under color of federal law
when he wrote a letter on Senate stationery demanding both a retraction
and the release to law enforcement officials of McClatchy's sources and
information. 97 McClatchy alleged that the use of official stationery and
Laxalt's signature over the caption" 'U.S. Senate' "91 implied that Laxalt
would use the power of his office to force compliance via retaliation.99
Relying on Bivens, the court determined that Laxalt did not act
under "the cloak of the government's legitimacy"'" by writing a letter
demanding a retraction, noting that such a request is required by Nevada
law before a libel suit may be instituted. 101 The court further noted that
92. 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985).
93. Id. at 739. See supra notes 53-55. Laxalt also included claims for conspiracy among
the defendants to commit the libel and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Laxalt,
622 F. Supp. at 739.
94. Id. at 746. See infra notes 279-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the abuse
of process counterclaim also filed by McClatchy.
95. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 747.
96. Id. at 747-48.




101. Id. The court stated that Laxalt "acted as would have any private citizen considering
the possibility of filing suit for libel. The fact that Laxalt is a United States Senator does not
automatically convert this action as occurring under color of federal law." Id.
The court was also concerned that finding Laxalt's letter to be an act made under color of
federal law would create a dangerous precedent, dissuading other officials from taking action
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the Supreme Court has recognized a public official's increased opportu-
nity for clearing his or her name "through the media"12--an opportu-
nity less readily available to private persons.'03
Citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., ° the Laxalt court noted the
Supreme Court's instruction to public figures to seek "'self-help' "105
and use "'available opportunities' ,106 to correct errors. 10 7 Thus, the
court concluded, Laxalt had only acted as required both by Nevada law
and Supreme Court directive, and neither the emphatic nature of the re-
quest nor the stationery upon which it was made was of significance.108
Moreover, the court noted that any person may request that information
retained by a newspaper be released to the police; therefore, this action
was not under color of federal law.109
McClatchy also claimed that by demanding the release of confiden-
tial information and sources, Laxalt intended to expose those involved to
physical harm and to inhibit the newspaper's first amendment rights by
preventing access to those sources."' Relying primarily on Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc.,11 the court stated that there was no constitu-
tional right protecting those sources, and thus the publisher's claim stood
unsupported.
1 12
In Miller, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a first amendment privilege
protected the identity of a confidential source, but stated that in a libel
case "the privilege must yield." '113 The Miller court proposed a three-
part test to determine when protection for sources is unavailable: (1) the
information must be relevant to the case; (2) the information must be
otherwise unavailable; and (3) there must be a compelling interest in dis-
closure of the information.' 
14
Applying the Miller test, the Laxalt court found that the "number
and credibility"11  of McClatchy's sources was relevant, since that infor-
necessary to clear their names while in office and inhibiting wronged parties from seeking legal
redress for their grievances. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 747-48.
104. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).






111. 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
112. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 749.
113. Miller, 621 F.2d at 725.
114. Id.
115. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 749.
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mation would influence the jury's ability to determine whether actual
malice existed when the libel suit reached trial." 6 The court also deter-
mined that McClatchy was the only source of the informants' identi-
ties." 7 Finally, the court found that such evidence might be the only
evidence which would show malice, thus satisfying the compelling inter-
est requirement.
1 8
In addition, the court rejected McClatchy's argument that Laxalt's
suit was filed "merely as a harassment device""'9 designed to deprive
McClatchy of its constitutional rights.'z0 In support of its claim,
McClatchy cited Cate v. Oldham,'2' in which an attorney brought a
wrongful death claim against the State of Florida and certain officials,
alleging that they had negligently failed to effectively prosecute a hus-
band for battery and that their failure resulted in the death of the wife.'22
The Florida state court granted summary judgment and attorney's fees to
the state; the fees were reversed when the appellate court found that the
wrongful death suit was not frivolous.'23 The State of Florida subse-
quently filed suit against the attorney for malicious prosecution. 124 The
attorney responded with a section 1983125 civil rights action, claiming
that the state's malicious prosecution action infringed the attorney's first
amendment right to petition the government.126 The court stayed the
malicious prosecution action, noting that protection of the attorney's first
amendment rights outweighed any damage to state officials resulting
from the delay in the malicious prosecution case.
127
The Laxalt court distinguished Cate on several points. '2  The first
amendment right involved in Cate was the right to petition the govern-
ment; in Laxalt it was the right to a free press.'29 In addition, the court





120. Id. at 749-50.
121. 707 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1983).
122. Id. at 1180.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). Section 1983 provides for a private right of action against
any person who, under color of state law, deprives a citizen of "any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws ...." Id.
126. Cate, 707 F.2d at 1180.
127. Id.
128. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 750.
129. Id.
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to "penalize and deter the filing of suits against the government." 130 The
court reiterated its conclusion that Laxalt's actions were undertaken as a
private citizen rather than as a government official and that his pending
libel suit enjoyed no government support.
13 '
The Laxalt court concluded its dismantling of McClatchy's first
amendment claim by noting that even when the press' rights are chilled
by a libel suit, that chill is the price exacted for the "generous stan-
dards"'132 of Sullivan. Citing Calder v. Jones,13 3 the court stated: "[N]o
other procedural protections are necessary to protect libel defendants...
because the New York Times standards already constitute significant pro-
tection, and further safeguards would amount to 'double counting.' "134
The court concluded that McClatchy's protection from first amendment
infringement lies in the actual malice standard, not in a Bivens type ac-
tion.1 3- Moreover, the court held that allowing such a claim would sub-
ject a public official to first amendment counterclaims when attempting
to recover damages, thus jeopardizing his or her ability to bring a libel
action. 1
36
Arguably, the court acted too hastily in rationalizing Laxalt's re-
traction demands via Gertz. The Gertz language relied upon was that
referring to the first remedy of an alleged libel victim-self-help. 137 The
Supreme Court indicated that an alleged victim should use "available
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error"'138 reasoning that
"[p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater
access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individu-
als normally enjoy."'
139
The Gertz Court clearly indicated that it was the public figure's in-
creased access to the communications media which justified assigning a
greater burden of proof to such plaintiffs. The Gertz decision echoed rea-
soning alluded to by Justice Harlan in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.14 °
Justice Harlan referred to the fact that both plaintiffs, football coach




133. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
134. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 750.
135. Id. at 751.
136. Id.
137. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
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ing public interest and had sufficient access to the means of counterargu-
ment to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies'
of the defamatory statements." 14 ' In his concurrence, Chief Justice War-
ren noted: "[S]urely as a class these 'public figures' have as ready access
as 'public officials' to mass media of communication."' 42
Thus, the Supreme Court assumed that public figures would have
the opportunity to correct any misinformation via channels of communi-
cation unavailable to members of the general public. Yet, the Laxalt
court cited the Gertz language to support its conclusion that Laxalt's sta-
tus as a public figure mandated his request for a retraction. 43 Addition-
ally, the court labeled Laxalt's actions as those of "any private citizen
considering the possibility of filing suit for libel.'" While this may be
accurate, it demands a tortured interpretation of the Gertz language to
support the Laxalt court's reasoning that a public official must request a
retraction. As Justice Harlan indicated in Butts, the public figure's ac-
cess to channels of communication affords him the opportunity "'to ex-
pose through discussion' ""' any falsehoods published about him. The
goal is the dissemination of information via "uninhibited, robust and
wide-open" debate 146 rather than to squelch information via retraction.
Arguably, had Laxalt issued a press release or held a press conference
responding to The Bees' stories, McClatchy would have had no com-
plaint and the Supreme Court's directive would have been clearly
satisfied.
The Laxalt court's treatment of the confidential source issue was
equally puzzling. The court cited Branzburg v. Hayes 47 for the proposi-
tion that a reporter's confidential sources are not protected by any consti-
tutionally secured right.'4 8 Yet, the issue in Branzburg was whether
freedom of speech and of the press was abridged by a requirement that a
journalist appear and testify before state or federal grand juries. 149 In
Laxalt, the request for the names of confidential sources came from Lax-
alt himself, not from the court. Branzburg would only be applicable had
141. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
142. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
143. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 748.
144. Id. at 747.
145. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)).
146. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
147. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
148. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 748.
149. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
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The Bee reporters been summoned to testify in the underlying libel
action.
This suggestion is supported by Miller v. Transamerican Press,
Inc.,"5 ° in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a reporter
must reveal his confidential sources, when relevant, to a plaintiff whom
he has allegedly libeled when the plaintiff has requested those sources in
connection with the libel action. The Laxalt court found the Miller
court's reasoning persuasive; arguably, however, the Laxalt court
"jumped the gun." Had The Bee reporters refused to disclose their
sources in connection with a judicial proceeding, Miller would compel
such disclosure. Yet, Laxalt's demand for disclosure was not connected
with a judicial proceeding. Such demands-at least at the pre-litigation
stage-should have been afforded more careful scrutiny.
The court concluded its discussion of first amendment infringement
by stating that press defendants must bear the chill which might result
from the institution of a libel suit "in light of the generous standards of
New York Times v. Sullivan."'51 The court cited Calder v. Jones'52 in
support of its conclusion, yet failed to discuss the substantial factual dif-
ferences between Calder and Laxalt. In Calder, the press defendants
were attempting to avoid the assertion of personal jurisdiction by a Cali-
fornia court pursuant to a libel action. 53 The United States Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction was properly imposed, reasoning that the
press defendants would receive sufficient protection by virtue of the ac-
tual malice standard to avoid any chilling effect resulting from the pend-
ing lawsuit.'
54
In Calder, the press defendant made no allegation that the libel suit
was instituted for any purpose other than the redress of grievances. In
Laxalt, however, McClatchy claimed that Laxalt was using the libel suit
to harass McClatchy and chill its first amendment rights. 155 The court
completely ignored the harassment claim with respect to McClatchy's
first amendment rights, addressing only the possible chill imposed on the
press by lawsuits in general.
156
150. 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). See supra text accom-
panying notes 111-18 for a discussion of Miller.
151. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 750.
152. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
153. Id. at 784-85.
154. Id. at 790-91.
155. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp at 748-49.
156. Id. at 750-51. Such a concern has not gone unnoticed by other courts, however, even
where the claim was not explicitly advanced. See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630,
633 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 380-402. In Schiavone Con-
str. Co. v. Time, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1985), the court waxed eloquent over the
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In sum, the Laxalt court failed to consider the implications of Lax-
alt's extra-judicial activities, choosing instead to apply holdings from
cases in which an alleged libel was at issue. In so doing, the court ig-
nored the possibility that attempted infringement had occurred, forcing
McClatchy to endure the effects of infringement while defending itself in
the underlying libel action. In light of this result, it is clear that a press
defendant will need to allege and prove facts stronger than those asserted
by McClatchy in order to prevail in a Bivens-type action. Proof that the
libel plaintiff brought the suit to harass the press defendant and infringe
its first amendment rights is essential, but without proof that the libel
plaintiff was acting in an official capacity, an action for infringement of
first amendment rights cannot survive. As demonstrated in Laxalt, re-
traction demands written on official stationery are insufficient to consti-
tute official action. Perhaps if such demands were accompanied by other
activity such as government-endorsed interference with the press defend-
ant's sources of information, the quantum of official activity would be
sufficient to support a Bivens-type action for infringement of first amend-
ment rights.
2. Infringement by a private party
While there is sufficient case law supporting an action against a gov-
ernment official for constitutional infringement, 157 there is considerably
less authority in support of a similar action against a private party. 5 8
Such actions present a problem because, in order to claim an infringe-
ment of constitutional rights, there must have been some form of "state
action." "State action" is action by "any level of government, from local
to national,"' 59 which intrudes upon the protection of individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. 6 The Supreme Court has defined this
term as "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
chilling possibilities of pending libel suits-particularly one focusing on "the deletion of one
sentence from one memorandum in one article in one magazine." Id. at 709 (emphasis in
original). The court noted that the suit may "result in a timorous and tentative press content
to report on births, weddings, deaths and craft fairs.... [T]he court wonders whether the cost
of the litigants in this suit, the ultimate cost to the media from all such suits, and the final cost
to the first amendment may be too expensive a price to pay." Id. at 710.
157. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
158. One commentator has gone so far as to term such a claim "exotic." Cutting & Levine,
supra note 9, at 16.
159. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147 n.2 (1978).
160. Id. at 1147. State action existed in Davis, Elrod and Bivens because, in each case, the
defendant acted in his capacity as a government official.
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law."' 161 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Sullivan, answered
the Alabama Supreme Court's assertion that there had been no state ac-
tion in Sullivan's claim against the New York Times, stating: "The test is
not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the
form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."' 62 Thus, Justice
Brennan reasoned, the fact that a court had applied a state law which the
Times claimed restricted its constitutional freedoms was sufficient to
properly bring the issue before the Court.'63
The Court relied upon similar logic some years earlier in Shelley v.
Kraemer."r The Court held that a private agreement to exclude persons
of certain racial backgrounds from residing in specific neighborhoods did
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but
that enforcement of such an agreement by a state court did constitute a
violation. 6 ' The Court specifically held that actions of state courts and
judicial officers were "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, such actions by courts or judicial officers which vio-
lated constitutional rights were subject to judicial scrutiny. 1'66
Although these decisions appear to support the theory that using a
lawsuit to infringe first amendment rights constitutes state action, at least
one court has distinguished Shelley and Sullivan from a situation in
which the infringing judicial or state action is merely requested by a pri-
vate individual. In Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale,'6 7 a
group of merchants sued the National Association for the' Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), the Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc.
(MAP), individuals working with these groups and banks in which these
organizations had deposited funds. The suit alleged conspiracy in re-
straint of trade, unlawful secondary boycotts and business interference
stemming from demonstrations and boycotts against the plaintiffs.' 68
Without notice or hearing, writs of attachment were issued against
NAACP funds held in the defendant banks. 169 However, the banks mis-
takenly attached funds of the Mississippi NAACP rather than the na-
tional entity named in the suit.'
70
161. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
162. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
163. Id.
164. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
165. Id. at 20.
166. Id. at 18.
167. 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971).
168. Id. at 1302-03.
169. Id. at 1303-04.
170. Id. at 1304.
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The Mississippi NAACP filed a civil rights action against the banks,
alleging that the attachment of funds made it impossible for the organiza-
tion to carry out its constitutionally protected activities.1 71  The
merchants amended their complaint to include the Mississippi NAACP;
the Mississippi NAACP then moved to enjoin the merchants from prose-
cuting their claim.172 The injunction was granted and the merchants ap-
pealed, claiming that there was no state action involved.,17
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. 74 The court noted that
the common element in both Sullivan and Shelley was that a final judg-
ment or dispositive order had been made, thus constituting the state ac-
tion. 75 Judge Thornberry eloquently reasoned that the "court is an open
forum before which each party is to have a full and fair opportunity to
make his case." '17 6 He concluded by stating that only after a court has
rendered a decision is the state's power exercised in enforcing it.'7 7
Under Judge Thornberry's reasoning, a party may never make an
argument for constitutional infringment at the trial level. Instead, the
party must wait for the infringing activity to be ratified by the trial court
and then assert infringement of constitutional rights in an appeal. This
argument appears to be economically unsound-both for the parties and
the courts. Not only will the parties be compelled to spend countless
hours and dollars in litigation, but the court's resources will be needlessly
wasted.178 If a plaintiff makes a claim which, if enforced, will infringe
the defendant's constitutional rights, is it not more logical and efficient to
allow the defendant to argue that a judgment in the plaintiff's favor will
result in infringement rather than to force the defendant to endure the
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1307.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1309.
176. Id. at 1310. The right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" is
constitutionally guaranteed. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
177. Henry, 444 F.2d at 1310.
178. Although Judge Thornberry's concern about access to the courts is valid, see supra
note 176 and accompanying text, there is an equally valid concern among the judiciary about
the burden of needless or frivolous litigation. See, e.g., Brown v. Gibson, 571 F. Supp. 1075
(W.D. Mo. 1983): "Plaintiff's right of access to the court is not absolute or unconditional....
This is particularly true where plaintiff has demonstrated a propensity for filing numerous
meritless and vexatious lawsuits which clutter the docket of this court and put defendants to
the time and expense of answering frivolous ... allegations." Id. at 1076-77 (citations omit-
ted). See also Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors, 548 F. Supp. 157, 164
(N.D. Ga. 1982) ("[A]ttorneys have an affirmative obligation not to clog the courts with frivo-
lous lawsuits.").
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expense and inconvenience of a second action? 17 9
In addition, if the plaintiff's claim is meritless, the defendant will
win the lawsuit, but the defendant's rights will have been infringed and
the litigation expenses will have been incurred. Subsequent actions for
malicious prosecution or attorney's fees will add additional expense and
may or may not be successful-leaving the press defendant with a some-
what empty victory. Worse still, the self-censorship which could easily
occur as a result of the infringement is irreparable. 8 °
The United States District Court recognized this logic in Galella v.
Onassis.'s ' Galella, a photographer, sued Jacqueline Onassis and three
secret service agents, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution and
business interference in connection with his attempts to photograph
her.' 2 Onassis filed a counterclaim seeking damages for, among other
things, violation of her constitutional right of privacy.' 83 In addressing
Galella's contention that constitutional rights of privacy can only be in-
fringed by state action, the court acknowledged that any act of a court,
"even the entry of a judgment denying relief," 184 constituted state ac-
tion.185 On this basis, the court reasoned that "the denial of relief in this
179. The key concept is that the libel suit must be meritless. See supra note 9.
180. Chief Justice Warren realized the irreversible effect of self-censorship in Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 66 n.6 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting):
Tolstoy once wrote: "You would not believe how, from the very commencement of
my activity, that horrible Censor question has tormented me! I wanted to write what
I felt; but all the same time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not be permit-
ted, and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I abandoned, and went on aban-
doning, and meanwhile the years passed away."
Id.
181. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
182. Id. at 199.
183. Id. Galella's attempts to photograph Onassis and her children, Caroline and John,
were varied and often obnoxious. He interrupted a private dinner party held at a restaurant,
initially taking photos while hidden behind a coat rack. The party ended abruptly when
Galella emerged, darting around the table to take photos of Onassis and the other guests. Id.
at 207.
While John and his mother were riding their bicycles in Central Park, Galella jumped
onto the bike path approximately 10 feet in front of John, forcing him to swerve quickly and
nearly causing him to fall. Id. On another occasion Galella appeared while Caroline was
playing tennis in Central Park. Galella followed Onassis and her daughter into the tennis
house, knocking Caroline into a wall. After Caroline went onto the court, Galella ran around
outside the fenced court, photographing her and her mother. Id. at 209. He eventually ran
onto the court, jumping around Caroline as he took pictures. She soon left the court, went into
the tennis house, and then began to walk home. Galella was within three feet of her at all
times, taking pictures and ignoring instructions from a secret service agent to leave Caroline
alone. Id. at 210.
184. Id. at 232.
185. Id.
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case-relief essential to vindicate a basic human and constitutional
right-would itself violate the Constitution."' 6 Clearly, the court had
concluded that Galella's conduct violated Onassis' right of privacy.
Galella's lawsuit, in effect, requested judicial approval of his intrusive
practices. Thus, the court determined that to deny, at the trial court
level, the relief Onassis requested would violate her constitutional right
of privacy.
This argument is further supported by Edwards v. Habib,"7 in
which a tenant was evicted after exercising her first amendment rights.' 8
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[a] state
court judgment,.. . even by adjudicating private lawsuits, may unconsti-
tutionally abridge the right of free speech."' 89 The court relied on Sulli-
van 190 and Marsh v. Alabama. 9 '
In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness faced criminal punishment for at-
tempting to distribute religious literature in a company-owned town.1 92
Employing a balancing test, the Court held that the state had improperly
favored the rights of the property owner over the rights of the defendant
to distribute, and the town's inhabitants to receive, the literature. The
Court concluded that the defendant's conviction could not stand.1
93
The Edwards court noted that both Sullivan and Marsh involved
privately initiated judicial activity and that "the state simply provided
courts and laws to settle essentially private disputes."' 94 Yet, when set-
tlement affected first amendment freedoms, the reviewing court em-
ployed a balancing test to determine whether the result was
unconstitutional-suggesting that the lower court's approval of the set-
tlement sufficiently constituted state action.'
95
The Galella and Edwards decisions suggest that the Henry court's
186. Id.
187. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
188. Id. at 688-89. The tenant notified the Department of Licenses and Inspections of sani-
tary code violations in her apartment. Upon inspection, over 40 violations were discovered
which the landlord was ordered to rectify. The landlord then issued the tenant a 30-day notice
to vacate the premises. Id.
189. Id. at 694.
190. The Edwards court noted that Sullivan was technically reviewed under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause as opposed to the first amendment. However, because the first
amendment has been applied to the states via fourteenth amendment incorporation, "there is
no reason to think that review under the First Amendment is more limited." Id. at 694 (foot-
note omitted).
191. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
192. Id. at 503-04.
193. Id. at 509.




reasoning is flawed. According to the Gallela and Edwards courts, state
action occurs when a court renders a decision. Therefore, when a party
asks the court to approve action which violates another's constitutional
rights, the court should decline to do so.
One case involving a press defendant followed such a course. In
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Ninio,196 a Los Angeles Superior Court judge allowed
a claim for violation of first amendment rights to stand. That case re-
sulted from a libel suit filed by Victor Ninio against The Cincinnati Post.
During a December 3, 1979 rock concert at Riverfront Coliseum in Cin-
cinnati, Ohio, a "human stampede" for preferred seating resulted in
eleven deaths. Ninio, a local ambulance service operator, provided serv-
ices at that event.197 The Post published two articles on April 3, 1980,
reporting that Ninio had been convicted of traffic violations prior to the
concert, that Ninio had smoked marijuana prior to the concert, that
Ninio's driver's license had been suspended at the time of the concert,
that one of Ninio's ambulances was not equipped to provide oxygen to an
injured person, that the keys were not in one of Ninio's ambulances
which blocked the path of another ambulance and that Ninio possessed a
Cincinnati Fire Department resuscitator more than two weeks after the
concert.198
Ninio filed a libel suit against The Post in Ohio.1 99 Although he
alleged that The Post's articles were false and defamatory,2" Ninio later
admitted, during his deposition testimony, that the facts reported by The
Post were true.20 ' E.W. Scripps Co., publisher of The Cincinnati Post,
and the other libel defendants filed a countersuit alleging that Ninio in-
tentionally infringed Scripps' federal and state constitutional rights by
suing for the purpose of "silencing" Scripps and punishing them for their
accurate reporting.20 2
196. No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984).
197. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Demurrer at 2,
E.W. Scripps Co. v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984) [hereinafter
Second Memorandum].
198. Id. at 3.
199. Id. Also named in the suit were William Burleigh, Vice President and General Edito-
rial Manager of E.W. Scripps Co., Paul F. Knue, Editor of The Cincinnati Post, James Chute,
former reporter for The Cincinnati Post and Paul Harasim, reporter for The Cincinnati Post.
First Amended Complaint For Abuse Of Process And Intentional Infringement Of The Exer-
cise Of Federal And State Constitutional Rights at 2 & 4, E.W. Scripps v. Ninio, No. C 500
144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
200. Second Memorandum, supra note 197, at 3.
201. First Amended Complaint, supra note 199, at 4.
202. Id. at 8-9. Ninio moved from Ohio to California after March 1980; consequently,
Scripps filed its countersuit in California state court. Id. at 2.
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Scripps argued that Ninio used the judicial processes of Ohio to im-
pair Scripps' constitutional rights, and that because Ninio's conduct was
"under the color and authority of Ohio state law,"'2 ° 3 the state action re-
quirement was satisfied. 2"
Demurring to Scripps' complaint, Ninio contended that his actions
had not met the state action requirements of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co. 205 The Lugar Court held that conduct alleged to have caused the
deprivation of rights must "be fairly attributable to the State. ' 20 6 To
determine fair attribution, the Court stated that the deprivation must re-
sult from the exercise of a state-created right, privilege or rule of conduct
or be caused "by a person for whom the State is responsible. '207 Addi-
tionally, the person allegedly causing the deprivation must be a "state
actor, '2 8 either because he is a state official or has received assistance
from an official, "or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State.
20 9
Scripps contended that because libel suits have the "potential to in-
hibit the free flow of ideas and information upon which self-governing
democracy depends"21 libel plaintiffs must adhere to the restrictions of
the first and fourteenth amendments. 211 In support, Scripps cited New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan212 and Edwards v. Habib.213
Scripps also alleged violation of its state constitutional rights to free
speech and press under both the California and Ohio Constitutions.
214
Scripps cited Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation of
Laguna Hills215 and Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center 16 in support
203. Second Memorandum, supra note 197, at 14 (emphasis in original).
204. Id.
205. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).




210. Points And Authorities In Opposition To Defendant's Demurrer at 17, E.W. Scripps
v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984) [hereinafter First Memorandum].
211. Id. at 18.
212. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
213. 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). See supra text
accompanying notes 187-95.
214. First Amended Complaint, supra note 199, at 8-9 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 and
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11). Although Ohio's Constitution limits its guarantee of free speech
and press rights to citizens while California's includes all persons, Scripps alleged that it en-
joyed protection under either standard. First Memorandum, supra note 210, at 12-13.
215. 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192
(1983).
216. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
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of its proposition.2 17 In Pruneyard, the California Supreme Court noted
that the protection afforded the rights to freedom of speech and of the
press by the California Constitution is "more definitive and inclusive
than the First Amendment.
218
In Laguna Publishing, a private, residential, walled community re-
fused a newspaper distributor permission to distribute his newspaper
within its gates. The court of appeals held that the distributor's rights
under article I, section 2 of the California Constitution had been violated
and that the distributor was entitled to damages. The court held that
under California law, the state action necessary to activate constitutional
restraint "is something less than that degree of conduct sufficient to enti-
tle one to a right of action for damages ' 219 under federal law. The court
further stated that the Pruneyard decision suggested that "a private indi-
vidual can be held to have violated the state constitutional rights of an-
other, at least the latter's free speech rights. 22 0
Scripps argued that these cases bestowed upon it a private right of
action against Ninio for violation of its state and federal guarantees of
free speech and press. The California Superior Court of Los Angeles
County agreed, overruling Ninio's demurrer for "reasons stated in
[Scripps'] responding papers. 221
Although the court did not speculate as to the motivation for
Ninio's libel suit, Ninio's admission that the contested statements were
true suggests that he was only interested in punishing the newpaper and
chilling the exercise of its first amendment rights. Following the Gallela
court's reasoning, the trial court would have violated The Post's first
amendment rights had it dismissed the countersuit, since dismissal would
have effectively amounted to approval of Ninio's actions.
However, since the court did not articulate its reasoning beyond the
reference to Scripps' memoranda, one can only speculate as to which fact
or legal theory was the deciding factor. Perhaps then, such an "exotic"
claim should be reserved for those fact situations which are so obviously
and unreasonably violative of constitutional rights-such as a libel suit
concerning a truthful story-that a more time consuming and costly
(holding that the California Constitution protects the reasonable exercise of free speech and
petition rights in privately-owned shopping center).
217. First Memorandum, supra note 210, at 13.
218. 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (quoting Wilson v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975)).
219. Laguna Publishing, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
220. Id. at 838, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26 (emphasis in original).
221. E.W. Scripps v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1984) (order overruling
defendant's demurrer).
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remedy, such as a subsequent action for malicious prosecution or attor-
ney fees, is unsatisfactory.22
Further comparison between Laxalt and Scripps prompts another
possibility: due to the more inclusive first amendment protection of the
California Constitution223 and the lesser degree of state action necessary
to activate that protection,2 24 an action for infringement of the rights of
free speech and press under the appropriate state constitution may afford
a more satisfying result.
B. Abuse of Process
Abuse of process is a tort action which involves use of the judicial
process for ends other than the redress of grievances-for example, to
compel a settlement or coerce the defendant into refraining from engag-
ing in unwanted but otherwise permissible activity.
225
While at first blush abuse of process appears similar to the tort of
malicious prosecution, further analysis reveals a number of differences.
Most relevant for this discussion, abuse of process can be asserted in a
counterclaim before the initial action has been completed.226 Because the
purpose for which process is used is all that is important, a plaintiff in an
abuse of process action need not prove that the original action terminated
in his favor, an element which is required in a malicious prosecution ac-
tion.227 However, the same set of facts can give rise to both actions, often
causing confusion between them.228
222. In two other cases, Feder v. Woodward, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1071 (C.D. Cal.
1985) and Rewald v. Western Sun, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2494 (D. Haw. 1985), counter-
claims for violation of first amendment rights were dismissed virtually without comment.
In Rewald, the court stated that neither party had cited any authority for the counter-
claim and that the court was aware of none. The court acknowledged that attempted infringe-
ment of Western Sun's first amendment rights could constitute the "collateral purpose"
requirement of Western Sun's abuse of process claim. See infra text accompanying notes 264-
73. The court held, however, that such attempted infringement did not stand as a separate
cause of action since the Constitution protects the press only from government, not private,
action. Rewald, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2495.
The Feder court was even more brief, stating simply: "The Counterclaim has not and
cannot allege the requisite element of state action." Feder, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1072.
223. See supra text accompanying note 218. Presumably, other state constitutions include
free speech and press provisions that have been similarly interpreted. Such a discussion is
beyond the scope of this article, however.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 219-20.
225. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 121 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. See generally Davis, Torts-Abuse of Process Defined, 28
ARK. L. REv. 388 (1974).
226. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 121.
227. Id.
228. Davis, supra note 225, at 394-95. For example: A sues B. B counterclaims against A
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Abuse of process and malicious prosecution can be distinguished by
examining the point at which each tort is established. Abuse of process
involves misuse of process after it is initiated; malicious prosecution in-
volves "wrongful initiation" of process.229
Section 682 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that
"[o]ne who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against an-
other primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is
subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of pro-
cess." 30 Thus, the essential elements of abuse of process consist of: (1)
an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. 31 The ulterior purpose
often results in an act of coercion to obtain a benefit or advantage not
normally associated with the proceeding,232 thus fulfilling the second re-
quirement. Dean Prosser referred to the use of an improper purpose as
"a form of extortion," stating that the tort results from "what is done in
the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any formal use of
the process itself."2 33 For example, a libel suit filed in order to coerce a
settlement when the plaintiff has admitted that the published information
was true states a cause of action for abuse of process.234 Even a demand
occurring before initiation of a lawsuit may be within the realm of abuse
of process as long as the party making the demand eventually files suit.
2 35
for abuse of process. B loses on his counterclaim, but successfully defends against A's suit. B
may now sue A for malicious prosecution.
229. Id.; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 119.
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).
231. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 49 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967) (see infra
note 235); Three Lakes Ass'n v. Whiting, 75 Mich. App. 564, 255 N.W.2d 686 (1977) (allega-
tions that defendants: (1) intended to use lawsuit to coerce plaintiff to abandon opposition to
condominium project; (2) abused discovery process by requesting discovery while delaying
response to plaintiff's discovery requests; and (3) agreed to settle case and then refused to
comply were sufficent to state a cause of action for abuse of process); Bull v. McCuskey, 96
Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980) (see infra text accompanying notes 236-43); see also PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 121, at 898.
232. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 121, at 898.
233. Id.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 258-63 for a discussion of E.W. Scripps v. Ninio,
No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984).
235. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225; Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249
S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967). In Huggins, the plaintiff was detained at a grocery store for
allegedly shoplifting two packages of sliced ham. Id. at 210, 153 S.E.2d at 695. The manager
asked the plaintiff to pay $10 for merchandise that he felt the plaintiff had taken in the past,
and testified that if the plaintiff had paid the $10, he would not have called the police. The
court held that the defendant grocery store "cannot divorce itself from responsibility for the
proceedings that resulted from the store manager's actions; ... the testimony [and subsequent
proceedings] were tainted throughout with the ulterior and improper purpose of coercing the
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In Bull v. McCuskey, 236 the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a deci-
sion favoring a physician who contended that the defendant attorney ini-
tiated and pursued a medical malpractice suit against him for the ulterior
purpose of coercing a nuisance settlement. The plaintiff, Dr. Charles
McCuskey, had treated an elderly patient's orthopedic ailments resulting
from an automobile accident. The patient's nephew, displeased with Dr.
McCuskey's performance, replaced him with another doctor. Although
the patient's condition was not traceable to the doctor's conduct, a mal-
practice action was filed.
237
The jury rendered a verdict for the doctor, who then initiated an
action against the patient's attorney.238 The court found that the attor-
ney had not reviewed or even obtained the patient's medical records. He
had not taken the deposition of the plaintiff doctor, nor had he attempted
to retain an expert witness for trial.239 Additionally, the attorney's re-
marks concerning the plaintiff during the malpractice trial were ex-
tremely derogatory.2' 4
In his suit for abuse of process, the plaintiff contended that the de-
fendant attorney had used the malpractice action to coerce a nuisance
settlement. The jury agreed, awarding the plaintiff $35,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages.24' On appeal, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict, stating that "it was
permissible for the jury to conclude that attorney Bull had utilized an
alleged claim of malpractice for the ulterior purpose of coercing a nui-
sance settlement. ' 242 The court reasoned that the defendant's offer to
settle for a minimum of $750, when he had failed to adequately research
the facts or provide essential expert testimony, supported the jury's con-
clusion that the requisite elements of abuse of process had been met.243
respondant to pay for merchandise that the store manager 'felt' or suspected he had previously
taken." Id. at 212, 153 S.E.2d at 696.
236. 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980).
237. Id. at 708, 615 P.2d at 959.
238. Id. at 709, 615 P.2d at 959.
239. Id. at 708, 615 P.2d at 959.
240. Delineating the extent of attorney Bull's transgressions, the court noted:
During trial, attorney Bull called Dr. McCuskey incompetent, a fumble-fingered fel-
low, a liar, a scoundrel, a damned idiot. He also said, "[i]t will be a cold day in hell
when I let that dum-dum take care of my mother." Of the doctor he also stated,
"[h]e will lie under oath, steel [sic] an elderly woman's redress, cheat if he can get
away with it, and all that is left for him is to make a pact with the devil and murder
those who would oppose him."
Id. at 708-09, 615 P.2d at 959.
241. Id. at 707, 615 P.2d at 959.
242. Id. at 709, 615 P.2d at 960.
243. Id.
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In Neumann v. Vidal,2' the plaintiff, Neumann, sued a competing
developer for abuse of process.245 Neumann claimed that the defendant,
RECO, had abused the procedures24 6 of the Maryland judicial system as
well as the United States Patent and Trademark Office in order to block
Neumann's company from competition.247 Relying on principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, the trial court dismissed Neumann's ac-
tion, because RECO had previously obtained an injunction preventing
Neumann from using or disclosing RECO's trade secrets. 248 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeal, noting that "an abuse of process ac-
tion can be maintained even where the earlier suit was ostensibly
legitimate, so long as the reasons for the suit are found illegitimate,
'249
held that Neumann was not barred from raising an abuse of process
claim simply because RECO had obtained an injunction. The court
noted that the question still remained whether the original suit had been
"designed 'to accomplish some end which the process was not intended
by law to accomplish'-such as frightening off [plaintiff's] investors or
delaying. . getting [his project] underway. 25°
Similar issues were raised in Alexander v. Unification Church of
244. 710 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
245. Plaintiff Neumann was an engineer and draftsman. One of his customers, Reinforced
Earth Company (RECO), had been established by the defendant, Vidal. Vidal had developed a
retaining wall system in the early 1960's; RECO was the United States licensee of the system.
Id. at 857.
Neumann decided that he could design a better system. In April 1976, he told RECO he
would no longer design and draft for them; in May, he hired a patent attorney who filed a
patent application for Neumann's system. Id. at 858.
246. Neumann encountered difficulty financing his project. In addition, RECO sued Neu-
mann, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, trademark infringement, unfair competition
and breach of fiduciary duty. Although Neumann was not found to have used or disclosed
trade secrets, the court issued an injunction forbidding him from doing so.
As a result of the litigation, interested investors withdrew. Further protest by RECO
delayed issuance of the patent until July 1982. Id. at 858.
247. Id.
248. Id. One factor upon which the trial court relied in dismissing the abuse of process
claim was the Maryland court injunction. However, the court of appeals noted that the appli-
cable question was not whether an injunction had been issued, but rather whether the initial
suit and the patent office protests were initiated for some improper purpose, such as frighten-
ing off Neumann's investors. Id. at 860.
The court of appeals also rejected the district court's reasoning that the Maryland court
had already considered Neumann's abuse of process claim since there was no evidence sup-
porting this conclusion. Id. Further, the court of appeals disagreed with the district court's
rejection of Neumann's claim based on equitable estoppel. The district court found that Neu-
mann was chiefly responsible for RECO's action protesting the patent application. The court
of appeals noted that this conclusion was reached after resolving issues of fact which should
have precluded the summary judgment rendered by the lower court. Id. at 860-61.
249. Id. at 860.
250. Id.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:45
America.251  There, the plaintiffs-"deprogrammers" 252 -brought suit
against the Unification Church, its president, Neil Salonen and its leader,
Sun Myung Moon, alleging violations of the deprogrammers' civil
rights.253 The action was in response to a suit filed in the name of a
young adult member of the Church whose parents wished to have her
deprogrammed.254 One count of the Alexander's complaint asserted a
claim for abuse of process. The court construed this count to allege that
the purpose of the lawsuits brought by the Church was not to obtain
damages for the Church members, but rather "to compel [the deprogam-
mers] to cease their deprogramming activities by putting them to the
trouble and expense of litigation. '255 The court held that a claim for
abuse of process had been sufficiently stated and that the lower court's
dismissal of that count was improper. 6
Each of the preceding cases suggests that when the facts indicate
that a lawsuit has been instituted for improper purposes-e.g., coercion
or punishment, and an act in furtherance of that purpose has occurred-
e.g., minimal settlement offers-abuse of process exists. However, no
specific test emerges from the cases. Thus, it is apparently left to the
factfinder's discretion to determine when that improperly motivated ac-
tivity has taken place.
Actions for abuse of process have survived motions to dismiss in at
least three libel cases.257 In E. W. Scripps Co. v. Ninio, 258 Scripps' coun-
tersuit included a claim for abuse of process. Scripps alleged that Ninio
251. 634 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980).
252. The court defined "deprogrammers" as persons "who work on behalf of parents in
what they characterize as an effort to restore new converts of unorthodox religious groups to
society by dissuading them from their new-found beliefs." Id. at 675. See generally Note,
Deprogramming Religious Cultists, I 1 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 807 (1978).
253. Alexander, 634 F.2d. at 675. The Alexanders moved to consolidate their suit with one
brought by Theodore Patrick, Jr., another deprogrammer. The district court did not rule on
the motion to consolidate, but simply dismissed the Alexanders' suit for failure to state a
ground upon which relief could be granted. Patrick's suit was dismissed for failure to state a
claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Only the Alexanders appealed. Id.
254. Wendy Helander, a Unification Church member, brought suit against Patrick seeking
substantial damages and injunctive relief under New York and federal civil rights law. The
Alexanders' complaint alleged, however, that Helander had only lent her name to the suit, that
she was without funds to bring the suit, that all expenses were being paid by the Church and
that any judgment Helander received would be turned over to the Church. Id. at 676-77.
255. Id. at 678.
256. Id.
257. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984); Feder
v. Woodward, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Rewald v. Western Sun, 11
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2494 (D. Haw. 1985).
258. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984). For a
discussion of the facts surrounding this case, see text accompanying notes 196-200.
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continued to utilize judicial procedures, such as requesting depositions,
after admitting the truth of the matters at issue in the libel action.
Scripps further alleged that Ninio's collateral purpose in requiring the
plaintiffs to attend depositions was to prevent them and other members
of the press from publishing any further accounts of the rock concert
tragedy and Ninio's involvement in it,259 regardless of the fact that the
event was "the focus of legitimate public interest."26 Scripps also al-
leged that Ninio's ulterior purpose in maintaining the libel suit was to
force the plaintiffs to incur litigation costs "as a punishment for their
truthful reporting." '261
Ninio demurred to Scripps' complaint.262 However, the court over-
ruled the demurrer, "for reasons stated in [Scripps'] responding
papers.
263
The court's ruling suggests that an allegation of misuse of process
subsequent to the filing of a complaint is sufficient to maintain a cause of
action for abuse of process. Further, the ruling suggests that it is suffi-
cient to allege that a libel plaintiff's collateral purpose is improper when
he attempts to silence the press and punish it for truthful or non-reckless
reporting by forcing it to incur legal expenses in its defense.
In Rewald v. Western Sun,2  a United States District Court denied
Ronald Rewald's motion to dismiss an abuse of process counterclaim
filed in response to his libel action against Western Sun, an Iowa corpora-
tion which owns KHON television. 265 Rewald sued the station and three
of its reporters for broadcasting allegedly defamatory reports about his
investment firm.266 The reports charged Rewald with "'running an in-
vestment scam' ,267 and misrepresenting certain characteristics of his
259. Second Memorandum, supra note 197, at 7. Scripps alleged that Ninio had required
two employees of Scripps to appear and give depositions in April 1984. First Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 199, at 5. Thus, Scripps alleviated the court's concern that Ninio had done
no more than file a libel complaint. Id. at 7-8.
260. First Amended Complaint, supra note 199, at 6.
261. Id. at 7. Ninio also refused the plaintiffs' request, made after Ninio's admissions, that
he drop the suit. Instead, Ninio demanded that the plaintiffs pay him $75,000 before he would
dismiss the libel action. Id. at 5. Ninio's actions were reminiscent of the extortion analogy
made by Dean Prosser. See supra text accompanying notes 233-34.
262. Demurrer, E.W. Scripps v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1984).
263. E.W. Scripps v. Ninio, No. C 500 144 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1984) (order overruling
defendant's demurrer).
264. 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2494 (D. Haw. 1985).
265. Id. at 2495.
266. The first newscast prompted the investment firm's collapse and Rewald's attempted
suicide and subsequent arrest. Id. at 2494.
267. Id.
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past.268
Western Sun filed a counterclaim alleging abuse of process, arguing
that Rewald had brought the defamation action not to recover damages
for the alleged defamation, but to intimidate the television station and its
reporters in order to keep them from reporting news about him.269 The
court, citing Dean Prosser, stated that abuse of process "normally con-
sists of misuse of a writ ... for a collateral purpose."' 0 The court rea-
soned, however, that "the process misused may be the summons served
at the beginning of any suit."27'
Finding that there were no facts in the record indicating Rewald's
purpose in instituting the defamation action, the court denied the motion
to dismiss the abuse of process claim.272 The court relied on procedural
grounds, reasoning that an action should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless there is no conceivable set of facts upon which the
plaintiff might prevail.273
The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia recently refused to dismiss a counterclaim for abuse of process filed
by Simon & Schuster and author Bob Woodward against Dr. Robert J.
Feder.z74 Feder sued Woodward for libel based on statements in Wood-
ward's book, Wired: The Short Life and Fast Times of John Belushi.27
The statements in question concern treatment for drug abuse and pre-
scriptions of drugs.27 6 Woodward contended that Feder knew that the
statements were true, and that Feder's true motives in maintaining the
libel suit were to obtain false publicity, silence inquiry into the Los Ange-
les drug culture, burden plaintiffs with the expense and inconvenience of
268. Id.




273. Rewald, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2495 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957)).
274. Feder v. Woodward, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
275. B. WOODWARD, WIRED: THE SHORT LIFE AND FAST TIMEs OF JOHN BELUSHI
(1984).
276. Feder claimed he was
defamed by statements reporting that he had treated Belushi for "overuse of drugs,
especially cocaine," that he "gave amphetamines, or uppers, to some of his patients if
they needed to be on for a particular performance or day" and for statements assert-
ing that Feder had used the name of Belushi's manager on prescriptions for amphet-
amines intended for Belushi's use.
Libel Plaintiff Charged in Abuse of Process Lawsuit, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) Mar. 19, 1985.
In response to a letter from Feder's attorney, Woodward offered to make available his source
materials for the book. Although Feder and Woodward entered into a written agreement
providing for Feder's review of the materials, Feder filed the libel suit. Id.
[Vol. 20:45
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litigation and silence criticism of himself and his medical practices. 277
The court declined to discuss the issue, however, denying Feder's motion
to dismiss the counterclaim in one sentence.278
Without the benefit of the court's elaboration on its decision, it is
difficult to know why it found the abuse of process claim sufficient to
withstand Feder's motion to dismiss. However, assuming Woodward
could prove his allegations-particularly that Feder knew the statements
were true when he instituted the suit-Feder's action could not have
been motivated by the need to redress a grievance and thus, on its face,
was abusive.
Yet, in Laxalt v. McClatchy, 2 79 the Nevada District Court required
more than allegations of baseless litigation. McClatchy Newspapers filed
an abuse of process counterclaim against Senator Paul Laxalt of Ne-
vada.280 McClatchy contended that Laxalt's purpose in filing a libel suit
against it was not to recover damages for the alleged libel, but "to punish
[MeClatchy] for exercising [its] First Amendment rights, to coerce the
disclosure of confidential sources, and to deter third parties, including
ABC and CBS, from publishing information about the Senator."28
The court dismissed the claim, stating that while McClatchy had
alleged an improper purpose, it had failed to allege abusive tactics such
as "minimal settlement offers or huge batteries of motions filed solely for
the purpose of coercing a settlement. ' 282  The court rejected
McClatchy's interpretation of Bull v. McCuskey, which suggested that
improper motive alone is sufficient to support a claim for abuse of pro-
cess.283 Instead, the Laxalt court concluded that the abuse in Bull re-
sulted from the attorney's minimal settlement offer of $750 on a medical
malpractice action, and that no similar abuse existed here.284
Under the court's reading of Bull, it is clear that McClatchy did not
sufficiently allege abuse of process in its counterclaim. All of the Sena-
tor's activites 28s appear to have occurred before Laxalt filed suit; had
McClatchy alleged similar activity occurring after Laxalt filed suit, the
result might well have been different. Yet this reasoning contradicts the
277. Id.
278. Feder v. Woodward, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1071, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
279. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985).
280. Id. See supra notes 53-58 and 92-93 and accompanying text for a description of the
facts surrounding this case.
281. McClatchy Memorandum, supra note 56, at 4-5.
282. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 752.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying note 281.
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holdings in Scripps, Feder and Rewald, which only required that a collat-
eral and improper purpose for the litigation be alleged. These contradic-
tory decisions appear to be irreconcilable, and perhaps can only be
explained by differences in state common law. Because the Feder and
Rewald courts avoided detailed analysis of the issue, however, any con-
clusion is, at best, speculation.
Yet, in light of these very recent and still pending cases, it remains
possible that abuse of process is a viable means of holding libel plaintiffs
accountable for the legal actions they initiate. However, as the Laxalt
case demonstrates, the crucial elements, an ulterior purpose and an im-
proper act in furtherance of that purpose, must be apparent to the court
and must extend beyond the usual request for damages or redress of a
grievance which is at the foundation of most lawsuits. Where the lawsuit
is pursued merely to harass or discourage the press defendant, an im-
proper purpose should be found. Moreover, according to Laxalt and
Scripps, a ridiculously low settlement offer or refusal to dismiss a suit
that is admittedly baseless will satisfy the requisite "act in furtherance."
Thus, careful attention to these requirements should result in success for
the press defendant.
C. Malicious Prosecution
Malicious prosecution is a tort action aimed at curbing suits brought
without probable cause. The term "malicious prosecution"2 86 techni-
cally refers to criminal actions. However, it has long been recognized as
applying to civil actions as well-sometimes referred to as "wrongful
civil proceedings."28 Malicious prosecution is distinguishable from
abuse of process in that the former refers to wrongful initiation of a law-
suit-one that the plaintiff knows or should know is meritless. 88
Unlike abuse of process actions, which can be brought before the
initial litigation is completed-thus making counterclaims and counter-
suits possible 2'--malicious prosecution requires that the previous action
be terminated in the malicious prosecution plaintiff's favor. 9' A major-
ity of jurisdictions require the following four elements: (1) an initial ac-
tion initiated against an individual; (2) terminated in that individual's
286. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 119.
287. Id. at § 120.
288. See Hughes v. Swinehart, 376 F. Supp. 650, 653 (E.D. Pa. 1974); PROSSER AND KEE-
TON, supra note 225, §§ 119-120. Abuse of process refers to use of the judicial process for ends
other than the redress of grievances-i.e., to compel a settlement or coerce the defendant into
refraining from engaging in unwanted but otherwise permissible activity, Id. § 121.
289. See supra notes 225-85 and accompanying text.
290. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 120, at 892.
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favor; (3) brought without probable cause and (4) brought with mal-
ice.291 Minority jurisdictions require that special damages or grievances
exist, such as interference with person or property.
292
An action for malicious prosecution has been successful in at least
one case concerning a press defendant. Marcum v. Kirk293 involved Ho-
mer Marcum, publisher of The Martin Countian, a small weekly newspa-
per in Inez, Kentucky, and Willie Kirk, a former judge-executive for
Martin County.294 The newspaper had published numerous articles criti-
cal of Willie Kirk during his administration.295 Willie Kirk had been
convicted on charges of extorting flood relief money, but had been later
pardoned and reelected as judge-executive.296 He sued the paper for libel
291. Id.; Dobbs, Belief and Doubt in Malicious Prosecution and Libel, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 607
(1979); Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analy-
sis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218, 1219 (1979) (hereinafter Groundless Litigation). See, e.g., Peerson v.
Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917) (successful defendant has an action for
malicious prosecution against a plaintiff who proceeded against him to his damage, maliciously
and without probable cause); Shaeffer v. O.K. Tool Co., 110 Conn. 528, 148 A. 330 (1930)
(plaintiff in malicious prosecution action must allege and prove original action was instituted
without probable cause, with malice, and that it terminated in his favor); Rosenblum v. Ginis,
297 Mass. 493, 9 N.E.2d 525 (1937) (plaintiff in malicious prosecution action has burden of
proving that the original action was brought maliciously, without probable cause and was
terminated in plaintiff's favor).
292. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 120; Groundless Litigation, supra note 291,
at 1219. Dean Prosser notes that jurisdictions rejecting special injury insist that the plaintiff's
heavy burden of proof protects the honest litigant. Jurisdictions requiring special injury are
concerned more with the possibility that honest litigants will fear retribution and thus avoid
legitimate litigation. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 225, § 120, at 890. In either case,
the dual threats of first amendment infringement and self-censorship should satisfy the special
injury requirement.
293. No. 82-C1-951 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 1985), aff'd, Kirk v. Marcum, Nos. 85-CA-798-
MR, 85-CA-951-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 1986).
294. Brief for Appellee and Cross Appellant at 1, Kirk v. Marcum, Nos. 85-CA-798-MR,
85-CA-951-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
Marcum founded the newspaper in 1975. He received numerous journalism awards, par-
ticularly for stories concerning corruption in Willie Kirk's administration. Id. Prior to Mar-
cum's establishing The Martin Countian, he taught high school journalism and was a reporter
for The Martin County Mercury, owned by John Kirk, Willie Kirk's cousin and political ally.
Id. at 2. Although there was some dispute as to whether Marcum quit or was fired by John
Kirk, Marcum subsequently began publishing The Martin Countian. John Kirk's Mercury
went out of business as did another Kirk newspaper, The Martin County Times. Id.
295. Id. at 3-4. The articles published included one questioning the legality of Willie Kirk's
purchase of land at a tax sale when existing receipts indicated that taxes had been paid. An
editorial following Kirk's election in November 1977 queried whether the election had been
"purchased" since an unusually high percentage (15%) of voters required "voter assistance" in
the voting booth. Marcum also reported that various members of Willie Kirk's family would
be on the county payroll at a combined salary of $60,000. A subsequent article reported that
Kirk was building private fox hunting roads with county funds. Id. at 3-4.
296. Publisher Wins Damages for Malicious Prosecution, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) Feb. 26,
1985.
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as a result of an article which stated that he had been involved in an
altercation with public officials in the Martin County Courthouse. 97
The article included an accusation by the county jail matron that Judge
Kirk had hit her in the chest and had run from the courthouse.2 98
Willie Kirk was represented by his cousin, John Kirk, who had un-
successfully prosecuted Marcum on charges concerning newspaper
sales.29 9 John Kirk had also filed three separate libel actions against
Marcum in the first four years that The Martin Countian was published;
all were resolved in Marcum's favor? °°
In the Willie Kirk libel action, the jury deliberated less than twenty
minutes following a four day trial before reaching its conclusion that The
Martin Countian article containing the jail matron's allegations was
truthful.31' In Marcum's subsequent malicious prosecution suit, he al-
leged that Kirk's action was brought without probable cause and with
malice.30 2 The jury agreed, awarding Marcum $21,000 including legal
297. Brief for Appellee, supra note 293, at 5.
298. Id. at 4-5. There was some dispute as to the argument's origins. The matron con-
tended that it centered on whether Willie Kirk and his political allies could dismiss the jailer-
the matron's husband-from his post. Kirk, however, contended that the argument centered
on whether jail employees' time sheets were accurate. The matron accused Judge Kirk of
hitting her after she told him "'Mr. Kirk, I hope.., you go back to the pen so I can yell suey
at you. I'll waive [sic] at the train that takes you away.'" Id. at 5.
Willie Kirk denied having hit the matron and requested that the newspaper issue a retrac-
tion. Marcum agreed to print Kirk's version of the events in a separate story which appeared
two issues after the initial article's appearance and which enjoyed similarly prominent place-
ment on the front page. Id. at 7. Several months after the second article appeared, Kirk filed
the libel suit against Marcum. Id. at 8.
299. Id. at 3. In addition to his position as publisher of a rival newspaper, John Kirk served
as county attorney from 1975-79. During that tenure, he prosecuted Marcum for "'unlawful
transactions with a minor,'" id., based on charges that Marcum employed children to sell
newspapers during school hours. Marcum was acquitted. Id.
300. Id. at 2-3. One of Kirk's libel actions, in which he served as both plaintiff and plain-
tiff's attorney, was brought only one month after The Martin Countian began publication. The
complaint was amended three separate times asserting four individual claims of libel. John
Kirk's "full scale assault through the legal system," id. at 2, was buttressed by a fourth libel
suit against Marcum brought by the purchaser of Kirk's Mercury. Id. at 2-3.
301. Id. at 13; Proceedings of Trial and Judgment, Kirk v. Marcum, No. 80-CI-473 (Ky.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 30, 1981) (original libel action).
302. Complaint at 3-4, Marcum v. Kirk, No. 81-CI-240 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 1985). Mar-
cum alleged that Willie Kirk knew that he had been involved in a fistfight with the jail matron,
that the resulting article was true and that therefore, Willie Kirk had no probable cause to
believe that his claims of libel could be factually supported. Id. at 3.
Marcum included John Kirk as a defendant, alleging that as an attorney and former pub-
lisher, John Kirk knew or should have known that there were no facts supporting Willie Kirk's
libel claim since Marcum had made every effort to obtain all available information and had
reason to believe that the story was true. Id. See infra text accompanying note 312.
Marcum also alleged that Willie Kirk was motivated by malice in bringing the libel suit,
since he was displeased with The Martin Countian articles critical of his administration and
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expenses, actual damages for lost time and wages and punitive
damages.3" 3
On appeal, Willie Kirk contended that he reasonably relied upon his
counsel's advice and therefore, probable cause for instituting the libel
lawsuit was conclusively established."° Yet, as the attorneys for Homer
Marcum so eloquently stated, "[tiurning to John Kirk for advice on
whether to file suit against Homer Marcum for libel [was] like asking a
Hatfield if he has good grounds to shoot a McCoy."3 °5 Clearly, John
Kirk maintained a bias against Marcum, as evidenced by his repeated
and unsuccessful litigation against Marcum. Moreover, John Kirk was a
rival publisher, competing in a small geographic area for a limited
number of readers. It was certainly in John Kirk's best interests to dis-
tract and deter Marcum by forcing him to expend considerable time and
money defending lawsuits rather than publishing a newspaper.30 6 Addi-
tionally, Marcum's printing company was included as a defendant in
each suit filed by attorney Kirk. Although the printers were dismissed in
each suit, Marcum encountered difficulty finding a printer willing to
print his newspaper without Marcum's promise of indemnity against
costs of litigation. 07 The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the issue
of probable cause was properly submitted to the jury.
30 8
It was unclear whether Willie Kirk supplied his attorney with all of
the facts necessary to formulate advice upon which Willie Kirk could
reasonably rely. Indeed, Kirk told his attorney that he did not hit the jail
matron and therefore Marcum's article was untrue.30 9 Yet, the juries in
both the libel suit and the malicious prosecution suit found that the arti-
cle was true.310 Accordingly, it is unlikely that Willie Kirk provided his
attorney with all of the pertinent information upon which to base his
was embarrassed at having the fistfight publicized. Id. Marcum alleged that John Kirk's mal-
ice stemmed from the lack of success his newspapers had suffered in competition with Mar-
cum's. Id. at 4. John Kirk was dismissed as a defendant. Brief for Appellant at 2, Kirk v.
Marcum, Nos. 85-CA-798-MR, 85-CA-951-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 1986) (hereinafter
Brief for Appellant).
303. Brief for Appellant, supra note 302, at 3.
304. Id. at 3.
305. Brief for Appellee, supra note 293, at 22.
306. Id. at 23. Marcum cited Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Hamlin, 193 Ky. 116, 235
S.W. 4 (1921) to support his contention that an attorney must be disinterested before a client
can cite reliance upon that attorney's advice as a defense to a malicious prosecution action. Id.
at 24.
307. Brief for Appellee, supra note 293, at 23.
308. Kirk v. Marcum, Nos. 85-CA-798-MR, 85-CA-951-MR, slip op. at 3 (Ky. Ct. App.
June 13, 1986).
309. Id. at 9.
310. Proceedings of Trial and Judgment, Kirk v. Marcum, No. 80-CI-473 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
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advice. The court of appeals rejected this argument, however, stating
that because the facts were in dispute, the lower court properly permitted
Willie Kirk to relate his version to the jury. The court further noted,
however, that both the libel suit jury and the malicious prosecution suit
jury reached the same conclusion as to Willie Kirk's veracity.' 
As an attorney, John Kirk should have known that Willie Kirk
would have to prove not only falsity, but actual malice. Yet it is unlikely
that Willie Kirk would have been able to prove that Marcum knew the
story was false or did not care whether it was true or false. Marcum
testified that he attempted to contact each witness to the alleged event,
although Willie Kirk was unavailable.312 Even more persuasive was
Marcum's attempt to present all sides of the story by subsequently print-
ing Judge Kirk's version of the incident. Clearly, Marcum's action indi-
cated a willingness to seek and print the truth. The court of appeals
ignored this aspect of John Kirk's participation. However, the court did
reverse the trial court's denial of emotional distress damages and re-
manded the case for a new trial on that issue.313
The Marcum facts suggest a situation in which the libel plaintiff and
his attorney attempted to litigate a publisher out of business. Under
such circumstances, where probable cause for the libel suit is non-exis-
tent and malice is apparent, an action for malicious prosecution is mer-
ited. Without such recourse, a publisher's "first amendment rights will
amount to little more than the right to go broke defending meritless libel
suits '314 brought by disgruntled subjects of public interest.
D. Attorney's Fees and Sanctions
An action for attorney's fees and/or sanctions is another possible
solution to meritless libel suits. 315 Some press attorneys believe that this
April 30, 1981) (original libel action); Trial Order and Judgment, Marcum v. Kirk, No. 82-C-
951 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 1985) (malicious prosecution action).
311. Kirk v. Marcum, No. 85-CA-798-MR, 85-CA-951-MR, slip op. at 4.
312. Brief for Appellee, supra note 293, at 6. One witness testified that she refused to talk
to Marcum about the incident because she was concerned about losing her job-a fate con-
trolled by Willie Kirk. Marcum testified that the witness' concern about being fired indicated
that he was "'on the right track.'" Id.
313. Kirk v. Marcum, Nos. 85-CA-798-MR, 85-CA-951-MR, slip op. at 8-9.
314. Brief for Appellee, supra note 293, at 29.
315. One scholar has called attention to our "increasingly litigious society" as a potential
threat to the judicial system's effectiveness. Mallor, Punitive Attorney's Fees for Abuses of the
Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613, 615 (1983). Professor Mallor noted that the judicial
system and those it serves suffer when the court is "forced to waste its limited resources on
proceedings that should not have been brought." Id. Mallor cited assessment of attorney's
fees as a method of discouraging such waste. Id.
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kind of action strikes directly at the heart of the problem, since attorneys
ultimately provide the counsel which results in the initiation of a
lawsuit.
316
1. The "bad faith" exception
In England, the losing party pays the winner's legal fees and litiga-
tion costs. 3 17 Conversely, the American rule provides that each party
pay its own legal fees absent statute or enforceable contract.318 Yet, a
court may assess fees "when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. 319
The "bad faith" exception to the American rule is the most versatile
and perhaps the most effective at deterring judicial system abuse.32 ° One
scholar separates the bad faith exception into four categories: (1) preliti-
gation misconduct; (2) substantive bad faith-the assertion of frivolous
claims, counterclaims and defenses; (3) procedural bad faith; and (4) at-
torney's bad faith.321
Bad faith which takes the form of prelitigation misconduct is subject
to an objective standard: was the plaintiff's claim "well-established in
law so as to render the defendant's opposition specious"? 322 However, a
stricter standard is applied when substantive bad faith is at issue.3 23 Un-
fortunately, case law defining substantive bad faith is sparse.3 24
In Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp. ,325 an
often cited case, the court stated that a claim must be clearly without
color and made for harassment or similarly improper purposes to meet
316. W. E. Chilton III, publisher of the Charleston Gazette in West Virginia, has included
attorneys as defendants in actions for fees and countersuits, noting that plaintiffs do not know
the law and rely on their attorneys' advice. Genovese, supra note 9, at 6.
317. Mallor, supra note 315, at 615.
318. See, eg., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). For a discussion of the American rule,
see Mallor, supra note 315, at 615-19.
319. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59.
320. Mallor, supra note 315, at 630, 652.
321. Id. at 632, 638, 644, 646.
322. Mallor, supra note 315, at 638 n.170.
323. Mallor, supra note 315, at 639.
324. See, e.g. Ellingston v. Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1981) (bad
faith existed where plaintiff filed sham pleadings containing false allegations twenty years after
gravamen of complaint was resolved). Yet, in Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617
F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980), the court stated that a meritless claim does not necessarily suggest bad
faith. Id. at 21.
325. 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
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the standard for substantive bad faith.326 This two step analysis has
come to be the accepted test for substantive bad faith.327 Procedural bad
faith is governed by the rules applied to substantive bad faith, although
courts appear more willing to rely on an objective standard.328
Actions for attorney's fees appear to have been the most successful
response to meritless libel suits thus far. In Beary v. West Publishing
Co.,329 the plaintiff sued West for libel after it published a court opinion
rendered in a suit in which Beary was the defendant. 330 Beary contended
that the opinion portrayed him in an unfavorable light.33' Prior to the
libel suit, Beary had filed a motion to vacate the opinion; in response, the
judge requested that the state reporter substitute the word "homeowner"
wherever Beary's name appeared.33' Although the substitution was
made, Beary filed the libel action, claiming that the version appearing in
the advance sheet "falsely and maliciously represented him, a lawyer, as
'conniving, contemptible. . . and a person to be avoided, shunned and
distrusted.' -3 West's motion for summary judgment was granted and
Beary appealed. 334 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed, holding that reports of judicial proceedings are privileged.335 The
court then awarded West double costs and $1,000 damages "[i]n view of
the complete frivolousness of ... [the] appeal.
336
Although the court declined to elaborate on its reasoning, this situa-
tion clearly suggests bad faith on Beary's part. Since the publisher had
made the requested correction, Beary's subsequent contention that he
had been libeled was untenable. Even more persuasive, however, is the
fact that Beary, an attorney, should have known that reports of judicial
proceedings are privileged and do not subject the publisher to liability for
libel. This factor clearly indicates the bad faith and vexatious nature of
Beary's action, thus warranting the award of fees and costs.
326. Id. at 1088.
327. Mallor, supra note 315, at 641-42. However, Professor Mallor has suggested a modifi-
cation of the second step. If a claim lacked reasonable merit, that finding would give rise to a
rebuttable presumption of bad faith on the part of the party asserting the claim. If that party
could show and support a good faith belief in the merits of his claim, no attorney's fees should
be assessed against him. If the party could not demonstrate a basis for believing his claim to be
meritorious, bad faith would be found and fees assessed. Id. at 643-44.
328. Id. at 645. See generally Mallor, supra note 315, at 630-52.
329. 763 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1985).
330. Id. at 67.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 68.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 69.
336. Id.
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In Daily Gazette Co. v. Canady, 337 the Daily Gazette sought a writ of
mandamus compelling reconsideration of its motion for attorney fees af-
ter dismissal of a defamation action filed by an attorney. 338 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals discussed the case law providing for
an assessment of fees when bad faith or oppression motivates the losing
party.33 9 The court also acknowledged the competing goals of un-
restricted access to the judicial system and the "unconscionable bur-
den" 34 that vexatious or wanton claims place upon "precious judicial
resources already stretched to their limits in an increasingly litigious so-
ciety." '341 The court further posited that while some claim that the right
to judicial access prevents sanctions against those bringing vexatious
claims, such vexatious claims inhibit the judicial access that supporters
claim prevents their sanction.342
The court rejected the Gazette's assertion that frivolity alone was
sufficient justification for a finding of bad faith, noting that "[iln some
cases ... frivolity may be less a function of improper motive than of
sheer incompetence. 3 43 However, the court held that an attorney may
be assessed fees and costs resulting from his or her vexatious, wanton, or
oppressive assertion of a claim unsupportable "by a good faith argument
for the application, extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.",344 The court granted the Gazette a writ of mandamus, compelling
the lower court judge to conduct a hearing as to the appropriateness of
an award of attorney's fees to the Gazette.
3 45
As in Beary, the court's reliance on the "bad faith" rule was appro-
priate. However, because the court declined to set out the facts sur-
rounding the litigation, it is difficult to ascertain whether the Gazette will
prevail in its request for attorney's fees. Nevertheless, the court's opinion
337. 332 S.E.2d 262 (W. Va. 1985).
338. Id. at 263.
339. Id. at 264.
340. Id. at 265 (emphasis omitted).
341. Id.
342. The court acknowledged the lawyer's ethical responsibility to zealously represent his
or her client "within the bounds of the law." Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1979)). However, it also noted the lawyer's duty to refrain from
asserting a frivolous claim and stated that conduct is acceptable which asserts a position sup-
ported by law or by a "good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of the
law." Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1979)).
343. Id. at 266.
344. Id. at 265. The court's language directly tracked that of MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1979) and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
try DR 7-102(A)(1), (2) (1979). See supra note 342.
345. Id. at 266.
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provides additional authority for the assessment of fees when the appro-
priate fact situation arises.
2. State statutory provisions
In Porter v. Qualls, 346 a total of $7500 in attorney's fees was awarded
to a radio statidn and the mayor of a small Arizona town, pursuant to an
Arizona statute, after the Arizona Superior Court of Navajo County
found that the libel action "'was harassment, groundless, and lack[ed]
good faith.' ,,347 The suit stemmed from a debate among Show Low, Ari-
zona citizens and city officials over the location of a new city hall com-
plex.348 In early 1983 a building purchase was proposed which Mayor
Ellis Qualls favored. 349 David Porter, a former councilman and mayor,
emerged as an opponent to the proposal.35° Porter claimed that a new
building could be constructed at a cost lower than the purchase of the
proposed existing building. A meeting was arranged between Mayor
Quails, Porter and a local builder after Mayor Quails challenged Porter
to substantiate his figures.351 However, Mayor Quails was called to an
emergency before the meeting commenced, and the builder left for an-
other appointment before the Mayor's return. 2
Radio station KVSL's president and station manager interviewed
Porter. The resulting report indicated that Porter had waited thirty-five
minutes for the Mayor to return and that Porter felt he had met the
Mayor's challenge.353 Mayor Quails prepared a statement to be broad-
cast which disputed Porter's assertion that Mayor Quails had irresponsi-
bly ignored an appointment and that Porter had proven his building cost
quotations.354
346. No. 20935 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1984).
347. Amended Judgment at 1, Porter v. Qualls, No. 20935 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1984).
348. Defendant KBW Associates' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in
Support of Motion at 3, Porter v. Quails, No. 20935 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter KVSL Memorandum]. Defendant KVSL's motion for partial summary judgment request-
ing dismissal of all claims for punitive damages was granted based on Arizona law prohibiting
punitive damages against broadcasters. Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees at 2, Porter v.
Quals, No. 20935 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1984).
349. KVSL Memorandum, supra note 348, at 3.
350. Id. Porter also served as city park commissioner from 1980 to 1982. The park was
named after him upon his retirement from city council in 1980, but the voters subsequently
elected to reinstate the park's former name, Show Low City Park, in 1983. Porter was active
in community affairs and admitted to being active in public debate. Still, he claimed not to be
well known in Show Low. KVSL Memorandum, supra note 348, at 3-4.
351. Id. at 4.
352. Id. at 5.
353. Id. at 5-6.
354. Id. at 6. Mayor Quails stated that he had substituted the city clerk and a councilman
[Vol. 20:45
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Porter responded to Qualls' statement and then requested that
Qualls' statement be retracted. 3"5 KVSL instead agreed to air another
response by Quails.3"6 Porter subsequently filed a libel suit against
Quails, the City of Show Low and KVSL.3 57
Porter's attorney later moved to withdraw from the case. 8 When
all defendants moved for summary judgment, Porter's new attorney sub-
mitted no opposition, reasoning that the applicable law was "favorable to
the Defendants' position. ' 3 9 Qualls, the City of Show Low and radio
station KVSL were awarded attorney's fees pursuant to an Arizona stat-
ute360 mandating such awards in frivolous actions.36 1 Both Porter and
his original attorney were held liable for those fees.362
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized the failure of Porter's
original attorney to examine carefully the significance of Porter's status
as a public figure, stating that the attorney's lack of investigation indi-
cated a "'sue first, ask questions later' attitude.,
363
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Inclusion of the offending attorney in the court's actions raises an-
other avenue of relief for the press defendant-attorney sanctions. Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires that all papers of parties
represented by counsel be signed by at least one attorney;364 the rule fur-
for himself when he discovered that he would be unable to attend the meeting. Quails con-
cluded his statement with the query: "I wonder why Mr. Porter is telling only half the truth?
Could it be that Mr. Porter is trying to embarrass the Mayor? I do forgive you, Mr. Porter,
maybe you are doing it only out of habit." Id.
355. Id. at 7-8. Porter's response began: "'It is not my desire or intention to get down in
the gutter with Mayor Quails.'" Id. at 7.
356. Id. at 8.
357. Id. at 2.
358. Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees, supra note 348, at 2.
359. Plaintiff's Porter [sic] Response Motion For Summary Judgment at I, Porter v.
Quails, No. 20935 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1984).
360. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(C) (1982). The statute provides in pertinent
part: "Reasonable attorney's fees shall be awarded by the court in any contested action upon
clear and convincing evidence that the claim or defense constitutes harassment, is groundless
and not made in good faith. In making such award, the court may consider such evidence as it
deems appropriate .... " Id. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 1986).
361. Amended Judgment, supra note 347, at 3.
362. Porter was ordered to pay the defendants $5000. Norman Kahn, Porter's original
attorney, was ordered to pay $2500. Porter and Kahn were held jointly and severally liable for
costs totalling $676.78. Id.
363. Id. at 2. The court also speculated that Porter's true motives in suing Quails were "to
settle some old political scores in addition to seeking redress for defamation." Id. The court
also found evidence of Porter's "ill will" toward Quails in Porter's letter dismissing his original
attorney "for not being aggressive enough." Id. at 3.
364. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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ther states that the signature indicates that the attorney has read the pa-
per and that it is well grounded in fact and not submitted for improper
purposes such as harassment, delay or increasing litigation costs. 365 The
rule then provides for the imposition of sanctions against the attorney,
the represented party or both.366 According to the Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Rules, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is an attempt to
expand the court's equitable power to award fees and costs to a litigant
when his opponent acts in bad faith.36 7
In Carr v. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp.,368 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Louisiana relied on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in inviting The Times-Picayune to file a mo-
tion and affidavits setting out attorney's fees and costs incurred.369 Plain-
tiff Jacqueline Carr had filed a civil action in November 1983, alleging
that certain St. Tammany Parish and Louisiana state public officials had
denied her the right to seek public office by changing the St. Tammany
Home Rule Charter.370 In June 1984, Carr was ordered to amend the
pleadings; upon her failure to do so, the suit was dimissed.37'
In October 1984, Carr filed suit against The Times-Picayune, alleg-
ing defamation and violation of civil rights arising from the same facts in
the previous case.372 The court found that because there was no state
action the civil rights claim could not stand.373 Pursuant to The Times-
365. Id. The rule provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Id.
366. Id. The rule further provides:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Id.
367. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The committee stated that "[g]reater
attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions
when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the
litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." Id.
368. 619 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. La. 1985).
369. Id. at 98.
370. Id. at 95.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 96.
373. Id. at 97.
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Picayune's motion, the court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction,
since no other federal question remained.374 The defendant also moved
for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 3 7 The
court stated that Carr's allegations "[found] no support in any possible
theory of law or any possible interpretation of the facts"37 6 and thus the
complaint violated Rule 1 l's requirement that complaints be filed in
good faith.377 The court concluded that Carr filed the complaint merely
to harass The Times-Picayune and that Carr had "unreasonably in-
creased litigation cost and clogged the judicial system. '378 Thus, sanc-
tions were warranted.379
In Nemeroff v. Abelson,380 plaintiff Robert B. Nemeroff alleged a
conspiracy to depress stock prices through dissemination of disparaging
reports published by Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly
(Barron's), one of the defendants.3 81 The only justification for Nemer-
off's claims was the existence of an investigation by the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the Securities and Exchange Commission con-
cerning the stock.38 2 However, more than one month prior to filing the
complaint, the NYSE determined that the charges lacked substance.
383
374. Id.




379. Id. Presumably, in light of the court's implied approval, such fees and costs were
awarded upon defendants' motion.
380. 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 620 F.2d 339 (2d. Cir.
1980), on remand, 94 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983). The
facts of this case were related with differing degrees of thoroughness in the various opinions
cited. Therefore, facts will be cited to the earliest opinion in which they appear.
In its first opinion, the district court established a "threshold" point which preceded its
discussion of the case: "[W]hile this is not a First Amendment case, it is not inappropriate for
the publishing defendants to argue that the court should not allow a party to misuse judicial
processes as a vehicle for restricting the exercise of defendants' First Amendment rights." 469
F. Supp. at 633.
381. Nemeroff, 469 F. Supp. at 631-32. Robert Nemeroff was a shareholder of Technicare
Corporation. Id. The defendants included various investors and three publishers: Alan Abel-
son, author of Up & Down Wall Street, a column appearing in Barron's National Business &
Financial Weekly [hereinafter Barron's]; Robert Bleiberg, editor of Barron's; and Dow Jones &
Co., Inc., publisher of Barron's and the Wall Street Journal. Id. at 631. Nemeroff alleged that
the investors conspired with the publishers to depress the price of Technicare stock. The pub-
lishers were alleged to have advised the investors of negative information in upcoming articles
in Barron 's; the investors were then allegedly able to "take a short position on Technicare,"
covering their purchases at a lower price after the articles were published. Id. at 631-32.
382. Id. at 635-36.
383. Id. at 636. Nemeroff's attorney was advised by a NYSE official on February 8, 1977
that "no manipulation of Technicare [stock] had occurred." Id. at 634. The court noted that
the attorney did not indicate any further communications with NYSE officials, yet the com-
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Subsequent depositions revealed no support for Nemeroff's
claims.384 In addition, the complaint was distributed to a newspaper re-
porter before it was filed.385 Although Nemeroff's attorney contended
that the action was maintained in good faith, the district court stated that
such contentions were undermined by "[t]he decisions to file the lawsuit
solely on the basis of unsupported gossip and inadmissible hearsay and to
supply copies of the pleadings to the press even before the complaint was
actually filed .. .386
The district court also discussed the publishing defendants' unique
position, noting that their business depended on their credibility.387 The
court concluded that the action's purpose "appears to have been to injure
the publishing defendants.
388
The court discussed its discretionary power to award fees in in-
stances of plaintiff bad faith, indicating that the supplementary powers
invoked by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 applied. 389 The court
awarded the publishing defendants $50,000.311
On appeal, however, the second circuit held that Nemeroff's claims
were not entirely without merit at filing. Accordingly, there was no bad
faith entitling the defendants to attorney's fees.39I This conclusion was
based on a rather short discussion of Rule 11; the court of appeals inter-
preted it as applying only to instances of bad faith commencement of
litigation.392 The court remanded the action, stating that if the plaintiff's
conduct was dilatory subsequent to filing, and if at any time sufficient
facts became available to Nemeroff indicating that failure to dismiss
amounted to bad faith, reasonable expenses should be assessed pursuant
plaint was not filed until March 25, 1977. The court found that this factor undermined attor-
ney Walker's assertion of good faith in filing the lawsuit. Id. at 636-37.
384. Nemeroff, 94 F.R.D. 136, 141 (1982).
385. Nemeroff, 469 F. Supp. at 635. Bleiberg, Barron's editor, received a call from a news-
paper reporter on the day the complaint was filed. When Bleiberg returned the reporter's call,
between noon and 2:00 p.m., he was told that the reporter had a copy of the complaint and
wanted to discuss it. Bleiberg's assistant made several trips to the courthouse to obtain a copy
of the complaint, only to be told that no such complaint had been filed. When finally a copy
was available, the clerk's notation indicated that the complaint was filed at 3:38 p.m. Id.
386. Id. at 636.
387. Id. at 637. The court stated that the publishing defendants' "business [could not] sur-
vive without a reputation for independence, honesty, integrity, good faith and fair reporting."
Id. The court further noted that Nemeroff's counsel was aware that the allegations at issue
were unsupported and constituted an attack on the publishing defendant's integrity, risking
destruction of their professional reputations for objective financial analysis. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 641.
390. Id. at 642.
391. Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 350.
392. Id.
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to 28 United States Code section 1927193 rather than Rule 11. 394
On remand, the district court found that Nemeroff's conduct-and
particularly that of his counsel-was dilatory and that Nemeroff knew
that the action should have been dismissed soon after filing.395 The
award of $50,000, assessed against both Nemeroff and his counsel, was
reinstated.39 6 Rather than citing Rule 11, however, the court instead
cited established case law for the proposition that a federal court pos-
sesses the "power to impose sanctions for bad faith litigation ... where
bad faith is found in the conduct of the litigation. 391 7 The decision was
affirmed on appeal.398
The court of appeal emphasized that it based its finding of "bad
faith continuation" of the lawsuit on the "particular circumstances" of
the lawsuit, stating: "We do not thereby create an easy test for the award
of attorney's fees to a successful defendant., 399 The court reassured po-
tential plaintiffs that a "colorable basis for a claim" 4" and good faith
action will insulate them from liability for attorney's fees should they
suffer defeat on the merits. The court cited Nemeroff's and his attor-
ney's choice to continue litigating "without an adequate factual basis be-
hind the case" 1 as the critical factor in affirming the fee award.4"
The preceding cases illustrate the availability of attorney's fees for
successful defendants in vexatious actions filed for harassment or frivo-
lous purposes, or where there is other evidence of plaintiff's bad faith.
Actions for fees can be supported by case law, state statutes and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Central to all three, however, is the press
defendant's assertion of plaintiff's bad faith. While little authority exists
393. Id. at 350-51. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West Supp. 1985) provides: "Any attorney or
other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States... who so multiplies
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of
such conduct."
394. Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 350-51.
395. Nemeroff, 94 F.R.D. at 140.
396. Id. at 146.
397. Id. at 145.
398. Nemeroff, 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983).
399. Id. at 660. The court noted that Nemeroff's failure to conduct discovery "at full
speed" was only one factor in its decision to award the publishing defendants attorney's fees.
Id. See supra text accompanying note 384.
400. Nemeroff, 704 F.2d at 660.
401. Id.
402. Id. Nemeroff was decided under an old version of Rule 11 which did not specifically
provide for assessment of attorney's fees. Pursuant to a 1983 amendment which took effect
after the last court of appeals decision, however, the rule currently refers to assessment of fees
against an attorney as an appropriate sanction. See supra notes 365-66 for the pertinent por-
tions of Rule 11.
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defining bad faith,40 3 it is clear from the preceding cases that the plain-
tiff's claim must be unsupportable and must be made for improper pur-
poses before bad faith will be found. It is encouraging to note, however,
the sensitivity of the Nemeroff court to the precarious yet fundamentally
important position of the press.
V. CONCLUSION
The circumstances under which the preceding solutions may be uti-
lized are limited indeed. Yet, given an appropriate set of facts, a counter-
suit may prove a viable option.4" Although such an action has not yet
met with success, a government official who initiates a meritless libel suit
in an attempt to suppress publication of articles about him or her should
be held liable for infringement of first amendment rights. A private party
who attempts to suppress articles about him or her by pursuing a merit-
less libel suit-in effect requesting the court's aid in infringing the press'
first amendment rights-should be similarly liable. While federal consti-
tutional guarantees may prove too inflexible to accommodate this action,
the court's order in E. W. Scripps v. Ninio suggests that state constitu-
tional guarantees may provide the press with protection from intentional
attempts to suppress publication.
A libel plaintiff who wields the lawsuit as a club in order to coerce a
settlement or suppress information should be held liable for abuse of pro-
cess. In addition, once a press defendant has won the underlying libel
case, it may file a malicious prosecution action or request that attorney's
fees be assessed against the losing party when malice or bad faith can be
proven.
Actions for the infringement of first amendment rights, and to a
lesser extent, abuse of process, remain speculative in light of recent dis-
missals. Yet, they are inherently more satisfactory alternatives because
they allow the press to respond to a meritless suit before the bulk of the
expense is incurred and the hours are spent. In addition, press defend-
ants may decline to consider subsequent actions such as malicious prose-
cution or requests for attorney's fees because the defendants are -not
insured for "offensive" actions, they lack sufficient funds to proceed on
their own, or they are simply too anxious to put the past behind them
and get on with the business of journalism.
Moreover, actions for malicious prosecution and attorney's fees do
403. See supra note 319.
404. Prominent press attorneys Robert D. Sack and Bruce W. Sanford caution, however,
that "countersuits will not become the silver bullet that kills meritless libel suits." Weber,
supra note 48, at 17. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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not remedy the intrusiveness of the libel discovery process. Neither do
they prevent the self-censorship which may occur as the press is con-
fronted with increasingly numerous actions. It is quite likely that a pub-
lisher would simply veto a story rather than risk editorial integrity or
economic security.
Yet, the real victim in all of this is not the press, but the public.
Because the public relies on the press for information vital to the healthy
functioning of a democracy, the press' role is not one of mere conven-
ience but of sheer necessity. When the press can no longer survive the
results of "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" 5 debate, the public will
suffer.4 06 Recognizing this danger, the Schiavone court stated:
Possibly the giants of the industry have both the finances
and the stamina to run the risk in such situations. But the in-
dependent will of smaller magazines, newspapers, television
and radio stations undoubtedly bends with the spectre of a libel
action looming. Even if convinced of the ultimate success on
the merits, the costs of vindication may be too great for such
media defendants to print or publish that which may entail any
risk of a court action. If that is the result, it is a sorry state of
affairs for the media, and, more important, for this country.
407
Indeed not all press organizations are mega-corporations able to pay
escalating defense expenses. The Point Reyes Light, a California weekly
newspaper with a circulation of 3500, won a 1979 Pulitzer Prize for ex-
posing Synanon.4°8 The paper has since been sued by Synanon-affiliated
attorneys for a total in excess of $1 billion.40 9 The Point Reyes Light is
representative of the press organizations that could be completely obliter-
ated by meritless lawsuits-leaving their readers with an information
405. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
406. In a somewhat different but complimentary context, the Supreme Court stated that
"[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners.., which is paramount.... It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail ...." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 388, 390 (1969)
(citations omitted) (upholding the constitutionality of an F.C.C. order requiring broadcaster to
provide tape, transcript or summary of broadcast to person attacked in broadcast and allow
access to air-time for reply).
407. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684, 686 (D.N.J. 1985).
408. Abrams, supra note 50, at 41.
409. Id. Abrams sets the number of lawsuits at six; Martin Garbus cites four such suits.
Garbus, supra note 50, at 49.
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void. It is this ultimate result which has prompted the solutions posited
in this Comment.
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